The Hiroshima Report 2014 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
--Exective Summary (in Japanese and English)
The Hiroshima Report 2012 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)

December 27, 2013

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(2) Commitment to Achieve a World without Nuclear Weapons (sections C)

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

C) Announcement of significant policies and important activities

Obama’s Berlin Speech

The U.S. President Barack H. Obama addressed his second-term foreign and security policies, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin on June 19, 2013. With reaffirming that “[p]eace with justice means pursuing the security of a world without nuclear weapons -- no matter how distant that dream may be,” he announced:
“After a comprehensive review, I’ve determined that we can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third. And I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures. At the same time, we’ll work with our NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical weapons in Europe.”[1]

December 26, 2013

[Op-Ed] Daryl G. Kimball, "The Humanitarian Obligation to Achieve Nuclear Disarmament"

Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons have driven global leaders to pursue concrete steps to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons use. Yet the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by the worlds nine nuclear-armed statesin response to conventional attack, in response to a nuclear attack, or as the result of accidental exchangeremains. As global leaders and the public consider how to reduce the nuclear threat, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons underscore why they need to act with greater urgency.

Over time, our understanding of the scope of these effects has become more sophisticated.  Early studies found that the direct effects of a large-scale nuclear exchange would produce catastrophic regional and national damage that would kill tens of millions and likely several hundred million people within one month of the initial exchange.[1]

More comprehensive studies in mid-1980s found that the direct effects of such a nuclear large-scale nuclear war involving thousands of nuclear detonations could result in several hundred million human fatalities, the indirect effects could be far greater, leading to the loss of one to four billion lives.[2]

December 25, 2013

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(2) Commitment to Achieve a World without Nuclear Weapons (introduction, sections A and B)

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

In 2013, no new, remarkable commitment toward a “total elimination of nuclear weapons” or a “world without nuclear weapons” was set out by NWS, NNWS or nuclear-armed states. As mentioned in the Hiroshima Report 2012, no country, including the NWS, openly opposes the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons or the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.[1] The Chairman’s Factual Summary of the 2013 NPT PrepCom also noted that the NPT parties “recalled their resolve…to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty.”[2] However, it does not seem that nuclear-weapon/armed states actually set a goal of an early achievement of a world without nuclear weapons, or even consider their total elimination as a feasible, realistic goal. They have kept their position that their nuclear weapons continue to play important roles for their security policies at least in the foreseeable future. Deeper nuclear cuts in the short-run cannot be expected.

December 20, 2013

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(1) Status of Nuclear Forces (estimates)

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

Back to the Contents

As of December 2013, eight countries have declared that they have nuclear weapons. According to Article IX-3 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.” China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States meet this requirement, and have acceded to the NPT as nuclear-weapon States (NWS) which are permitted to possess nuclear weapons under the treaty.

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] Contents

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

Countries surveyed
  • Nuclear-weapon states under the NPT: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States)
  • Non-state parties to the NPT: India, Israel and Pakistan
  • Non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT:  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, UAE
  • Other: North Korea

(Link will be attached when draft is available)
1. Nuclear Disarmament 
(2) Commitment to Achieve a World without Nuclear Weapons
        - Obama’s Berlin Speech
        - Open-Ended Working Group
        - High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament
        - Oslo Conference
        - Joint Statement at the NPT PrepCom
        - Joint Statement at the First Committee
        - Response from Nuclear-Weapon States
   A) Reduction of nuclear weapons
   B) A concrete plan for further reduction of nuclear weapons
   C) Trends on strengthening/modernizing nuclear weapons capabilities
   A) Current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons in national security strategies and policies, as well as military alliance
   B) Commitment to the “sole purpose,” no first use, and related doctrines
   C) Negative security assurances
   D) Signing and ratifying the protocols of the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones
   E) Relying on extended nuclear deterrence
(6) CTBT
   A) Signing and ratifying the CTBT
   B) Moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending CTBT's entry into force
   C) Cooperation with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission
   D) Contribution to the development of the CTBT verification systems
   E) Nuclear testing
(7) FMCT
(8) Transparency in nuclear forces, fissile material for nuclear weapons, and nuclear strategy/doctrine
(9) Verification of nuclear weapons reductions
   A) Implementing or planning dismantlement of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles
   B) Decommissioning/conversion of nuclear weapons-related facilities
   C) Measures for the fissile material declared excess for military purposes, such as disposition or conversion to peaceful purposes
(11) Disarmament and non-proliferation education and cooperation with civil society

2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
   A) Accession to the NPT
   B) Compliance with Article 1 and 2 of the NPT and the UNSC Resolutions on Non-Proliferation
   C) Establishment of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
   A) Signing and Ratifying a Safeguards Agreement
   B) Compliance with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement
   A) Establishment and implementation of the national implementation system
   B) Requiring the Conclusion of the Additional Protocol for Nuclear Export
   C) Implementation of the UNSCR on North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues
   D) Participation in the PSI
   E) Civil nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT

3. Nuclear Security 

December 12, 2013

[Op-Ed] Harald Müller, "Stability of the NPT Hinges on Justice"

The Hiroshima Report undertakes the important effort to work out a balance of compliance by different groups of parties with their undertakings of the NPT as specified by Review Conferences. While it does not aspire to presenting a strictly comparable record for the NPT’s “pillars” and for the compliance of different groups of parties, it offers an opportunity to readers to draw such a balance for themselves. In addition, it presumes that “balancing” matters. And this is the important point.

A convincing balance means, eventually, that the weighing between the three pillars is satisfactory to the parties, and that the compliance balance between the parties arrives at scores that parties themselves feel are appropriate, because the balance is fair. Recurring on fairness as a standard for judging politics in the security sector may strike readers as odd, at first glance. However, this consideration is in line with a key finding of half a dozen academic disciplines over the last twenty years, including some hard sciences: brain research, evolutionary biology, anthropology, social and child psychology, sociology and experimental economics, all of which converge on one finding:

Justice matters in human affairs!
Mainstream economists, International Relations "realists", and friends of "Realpoltiik" believe that international politics is all about maximizing utility (wealth, power etc.). They are wrong. Justice concerns awake emotions: Fulfillment of our claims for justice makes us happy; denial makes us angry and aggressive. For that reason, justice concerns can foster security cooperation (if the rules and norms of cooperation are seen by parties as fair and just) and can impede or even destroy it (when they are seen by parties as unjust and unfair).

December 9, 2013

[Op-Ed] Fan Jishe, "China's Nuclear Policy: An Evaluation"

Even the international security environment has undergone dramatic changes since China detonated its first nuclear device about four decades ago, China's nuclear policy remains largely unchanged ever since. When evaluating the five Nuclear Weapon States' nuclear policy, scholars and commentators have quite different views. Some pay much more attention to the opaqueness of China's nuclear posture, while others argue the merits of China's transparency in strategic intention, and China's restraint in nuclear development.

In recent years, there are rising concerns of China's nuclear policy, especially after President Obama's Prague Speech, and the Global Zero Campaign. Many scholars, commentators, even government officials complained China's indifferent attitude toward these movements, and they expected China could take some actions either to echo President Obama's Prague Speech, or to endorse the Global Zero Campaign. China's lack of action is only part of the story. With the development of China's military capability, some begin to worry that China might build up its nuclear arsenal, even sprint to parity (matching the United States and Russia's nuclear capability in numerical sense), while the United States and Russia try to build down; others suspect that China might change its No First Use policy. Generally speaking, nuclear transparency remains the key concern for China observers, especially the information related to nuclear numbers and nuclear modernization programs.

December 6, 2013

[Op-Ed] Rajiv Nayan, "The Hiroshima Report and Security without Nuclear Weapons"

The Hiroshima Report-Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: 2012-2012 is a laudable narrative of the global nuclear status and international security. The Report published by Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, has two principal parts: one details the facts on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security initiatives and the second, an evaluation of 19 countries on 11 criteria in 6 categories or ‘aspects’ of the nuclear issues. The factual account is intended to justify the evaluation or the points assigned to each country.

Although the Report does not explicitly advocate nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation, yet the tone and tenor of the Report clearly indicates that underlying objective of the Report is to see a world without nuclear weapons, and till such a goal is realized to attain a secure and stable world through nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Even if the objective is implicit, it is an admirable and worth doing so. However, the Report needs to do more work in terms of compiling objective data in the first part and assigning points to different criteria in the second to have objectivity.

What is the biggest hurdle of global nuclear disarmament? The answer to it is simple and straightforward: the lack of credible movement towards nuclear disarmament by the countries which are possessing more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenals. However, in the evaluation criteria, a country possessing 1001-2000 nuclear weapons may score minus 14 points, a country possessing 6001-8000 nuclear weapons may score minus 19 and a country possessing more than 8000 minus 20 points.

December 2, 2013

[Op-Ed] Charles D. Ferguson, "Implications of the Recent Deal with Iran on Getting Controls on Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycles"

The Hiroshima Report is a tour de force in its comprehensiveness and clarity in examining the status of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and nuclear security.  I commend the excellent work of the report’s authors and staff.

In my comments, I would like to focus on one of the biggest international challenges to nonproliferation: how states can walk up to the line of crossing into nuclear weapons capability by developing uranium enrichment plants or reprocessing plants. Both of these technologies are dual-use in that the same enrichment plant can be used to make low-enriched uranium useful for fueling peaceful nuclear reactors or to further enrich to high enough concentrations of the fissile isotope uranium-235 useful for powering nuclear weapons. Similarly, reprocessing plants can be used to separate plutonium and other fissionable materials for recycling into new fuel for reactors or for manufacturing those materials into nuclear weapons.

Very few non-nuclear weapon states have one or both of these technologies. Those non-nuclear weapon states that are presently active in enrichment are Brazil, Germany, Iran, Japan, and the Netherlands, and in reprocessing, only Japan has an active commercial reprocessing plant and does not have nuclear arms. Thus, the one non-nuclear weapon country that has both enrichment and reprocessing is Japan.