The
Hiroshima Report is a tour de force in its
comprehensiveness and clarity in examining the status of nuclear disarmament,
nonproliferation, and nuclear security.
I commend the excellent work of the report’s authors and staff.
In my comments, I would like to focus on
one of the biggest international challenges to nonproliferation: how states can
walk up to the line of crossing into nuclear weapons capability by developing
uranium enrichment plants or reprocessing plants. Both of these technologies
are dual-use in that the same enrichment plant can be used to make low-enriched
uranium useful for fueling peaceful nuclear reactors or to further enrich to
high enough concentrations of the fissile isotope uranium-235 useful for
powering nuclear weapons. Similarly, reprocessing plants can be used to
separate plutonium and other fissionable materials for recycling into new fuel
for reactors or for manufacturing those materials into nuclear weapons.
Very few non-nuclear weapon states have one
or both of these technologies. Those non-nuclear weapon states that are
presently active in enrichment are Brazil, Germany, Iran, Japan, and the
Netherlands, and in reprocessing, only Japan has an active commercial
reprocessing plant and does not have nuclear arms. Thus, the one non-nuclear weapon
country that has both enrichment and reprocessing is Japan.
Japan, as the report underscores, has a special responsibility. It has taken extra steps to instill confidence that its nuclear program is well safeguarded and secure. In particular, it was the first major nuclear power producing nation to ratify and apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. It has also established a center of excellence on nuclear security. However, as Dr. James Acton rightly points out in his commentary, Japan’s plutonium stockpile has raised concern among neighboring states, and its potential near term restart of the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant could further increase concern about a growing stockpile of separated plutonium. Japan’s actions have influenced other nations, in particular, Iran, whose leaders have often said that they want their nuclear program treated like Japan’s.
Could the new deal with Iran reached during
the weekend of 22-23 November have implications for Japan and other non-nuclear
weapon states like South Korea that aspire to acquire enrichment or
reprocessing capabilities? The short answer is yes in that I believe it will
affect the issue of the right to enrich, the effectiveness of safeguards, the
cap on nuclear material stockpiles, and the enforcement ability of the UN
Security Council.
Probably the biggest issue, certainly for
Iran, is rights. Iran’s red line in the negotiations has consistently been to
receive recognition from the United States, China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the European Union (the P5+1) that Iran has an official right to
continue enriching uranium. While the recent deal with Iran does not explicitly
endorse Iran’s right to enrich uranium, one could argue that the deal gives de
facto approval because it allows Iran to continue enriching uranium. This is despite the UN Security Council
resolutions calling on Iran to cease uranium enrichment. The facts on Iran’s
ground, namely about 11,000 working centrifuges, create a reality that the P5+1
diplomats could not ignore. While international sanctions helped bring Iran to
the negotiating table to open itself up for compromise, these sanctions were
not sufficient to compel Iran to stop enrichment. Any additional sanctions,
short of war, would likely not have moved Iranian leaders to cease this
activity. The domestic political reality was that even a reformer like the
newly inaugurated Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had to uphold Iran’s
national pride in joining a select club of nations that have mastered
enrichment. President Rouhani never seriously considered giving up on
enrichment.
Continued Iranian enrichment will most
likely affect U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements. For instance, it will be
harder for the United States to argue to the Republic of Korea in the
negotiations over the renewal of their nuclear cooperation agreement that Korea
cannot enrich uranium or pyroprocess spent nuclear fuel. The latter activity is
designed to recycle fissionable material in certain types of reactors. While
some in the U.S. nonproliferation community have argued for a so-called gold
standard like the U.S.-UAE nuclear deal in which the UAE pledged to not enrich
or reprocess, the agreement with Iran will further lend support to those who
argue that the United States needs to consider nuclear cooperation agreements
on a case-by-case basis.
In regards to safeguards, the deal with
Iran moves in the direction of more effective monitoring. The deal stipulates
that there will be daily inspections or at least inspectors constantly present
to monitor suspect facilities. In some respects, this is similar to the
continuous presence of safeguards inspectors at the Rokkasho reprocessing
facility. While having an inspector continuously present does not guarantee
that there will not be a diversion of nuclear material, this serves as an additional measure that almost
all non-nuclear weapon states do not apply to their facilities. But Japan, as
noted above, is in a special status. Indeed, Iran is in another special
category that requires it to prove its peaceful intentions. The next deal with Iran should
include additional provisions for near-real time monitoring of enrichment
facilities, as well as other activities that could further Iran’s
breakout capability into a nuclear weapons program.
The deal sets a cap on the amount of
enriched uranium that Iran is allowed to hold and requires Iran to convert its
stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to forms that would impose barriers to
diversion into a weapons program. This meaningful action has implications for
Japan. One could argue
that Japan should substantially reduce its stockpile of weapons-usable
plutonium to instill greater confidence that it could not use this material for
weapons purposes.
Finally, the deal with Iran calls into question whether the UN
Security Council is an effective body for enforcing compliance with safeguards.
As mentioned, Iran flouted the resolutions calling on ceasing enrichment.
However, the resolutions did serve the purpose of bringing together the P5
although there were disagreements among the major powers. But the fact that the
P5 is also the five official nuclear weapon states underscores that the
Security Council derives its power from the "haves" while the "have-nots" do not
have permanent seats. I recommend that
the supporters of The Hiroshima Report can next take on the challenging task of reforming the
international political system to make it more amenable to nuclear disarmament
and enforcement of nonproliferation.
Dr. Charles D. Ferguson, president of the
Federation of American Scientists, is the author of the book Nuclear Energy: What Everyone Needs to Know.
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