The
Hiroshima Report-Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear
Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: 2012-2012 is a laudable narrative of the global nuclear status and
international security. The Report published by Center for the Promotion of Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo,
Japan, has two principal parts: one details the facts on nuclear disarmament,
non-proliferation and nuclear security initiatives and the second, an
evaluation of 19 countries on 11 criteria in 6 categories or ‘aspects’ of the
nuclear issues. The factual account is intended to justify the evaluation or
the points assigned to each country.
Although the Report does not
explicitly advocate nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation, yet the tone and tenor
of the Report clearly indicates that underlying objective of the Report is to
see a world without nuclear weapons, and till such a goal is realized to attain
a secure and stable world through nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
security. Even if the objective is implicit, it is an admirable and worth doing
so. However, the Report needs to do more work in terms of compiling objective data in
the first part and assigning points to different criteria in the second to have
objectivity.
What is the biggest hurdle of global
nuclear disarmament? The answer to it is simple and straightforward: the lack
of credible movement towards nuclear disarmament by the countries which are
possessing more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenals. However, in
the evaluation criteria, a country possessing 1001-2000 nuclear weapons may
score minus 14 points, a country possessing 6001-8000 nuclear weapons may score
minus 19 and a country possessing more than 8000 minus 20 points.
Thus, a country just loses 5-6 points for
keeping a huge arsenal. However, it may gain more points by still maintaining a
huge stockpile but reducing a small amount every year for 5 years under a ‘certain
legal framework.’ A mere announcement for reduction helps it garner more points. Worse,
a country gains 3 points for modernization of nuclear weapons without
increasing the number and 4 points for not modernizing. It means the difference
is of only 1 point for not modernizing. Currently, all the old nuclear weapons
countries are discarding their redundant cold war nuclear weapons and modernizing their nuclear weapons and the delivery systems. According to the
logic of the document, therefore, the old nuclear weapons countries which are the
signatories of the NPT score more points than new nuclear weapons countries who
are not.
The current global trend is to keep small,
lean but enough nuclear weapons for a quick strike. The move away from overkill
to mass kill is not by itself a laudable goal. It may be better if there is some
concrete plan of action toward nuclear zero. Without a time-bound plan for a complete
elimination of nuclear weapons, the idea and argument for their reduction is
meaningless, could even be dangerous. It is meaningless because it is still possible
to destroy a large section of civil population and troops with very few weapons.
It is dangerous because it still makes it legitimate to possess fewer nuclear
weapons according to this logic, and may tempt others to go for these to
address their own threat perception notwithstanding the resolution that the new
nuclear countries may have to return their nuclear materials. Even the return
of materials and goods advocated by the doucment could be difficult and
complicated.
Another group of non-NPT nuclear weapon countries
such as India and Israel will find it difficult to live under the guidelines
imposed by the NPT. This set of countries may have to resolve issues arising
from their membership of the NPT, to maintain safety of nuclear arsenals and
fissile material production. India is facing difficulties becoming a member of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and a couple of other regimes because of the NPT
adherence/membership criteria. Similarly, it is facing challenges in procuring
uranium for its expanding civil nuclear energy plan at some places because of
the same criteria. Moreover, the Report is not giving points to these countries
for staying away from the NPT.
The Report, in its first part, mentions sub-critical
tests. The countries with old nuclear history are in possession of data
procured through countless tests; apparently, the data may be used for refining
warheads of most of the old nuclear weapons countries. A country like the US
has confirmed it; others are quietly pursuing the path. The new countries with
a few tests or no test may struggle to keep their arsenals safe and secure. As
for fissile materials, the same story continues. Older countries except China
are trying to get rid of excess fissile materials, and may go for a Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty. Newer countries may find their stocks inadequate for
even minimum deterrence.
In fact, the Report’s separate and detailed
treatment on non-proliferation has some problems as well. Allotment of points
for criteria like IAEA Safeguards should have been done in a different way for
a country like India. What is the objective of a safeguards system? The
objective is seemingly to ensure the prevention of diversion of nuclear goods. The
points should have been structured with this factor in mind. Different points
allotted for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security seem highly
subjective and at places incomprehensible. Please give examples.
The Report needs to pay attention to some
other issues. Quite puzzlingly, the Report does not pay much attention to the
proliferation network. The Proliferation Security Initiative has its own
weaknesses and complications. The
allotment of points to an initiative like this may easily enable critics to dub
the Report as one that promotes a Western perspective. In the nuclear security
section, too, initiatives such as Cooperative Threat Reduction and G8 Global
Partnership have found place. A report that evaluates countries’ commitment to
universal or near universal initiatives should avoid incorporating Western
initiatives. The countries holding nuclear umbrella have scored good points.
This is not fair because even in their security schemes nuclear weapons are
playing a greater role.
In sum, the Report is a good exercise to remind
the world about the disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security
commitments of the key countries. It is much better than many other reports
circulating on this topic. However, it may have to remove some of the
methodological fallacies to improve its conclusions. Somehow, any such report may have to keep certain
security parameters in mind. The P-5 countries are not willing to give up their
nuclear weapons, and a country like India, which has security issues with one
of the nuclear weapon countries, may be forced to take remedial action. Because
of the NPT cut-off date for determining a country nuclear or non-nuclear, it
may not join it. In such a situation, the indexing brings its ranking down.
In reality, a Nuclear Weapons Convention
should be signed, and all the non-proliferation measures need to be linked to
its progress. If any country is found defaulting in its commitment, the country
should be held guilty. The current ranking indicated in the Report on an “ad
hoc” basis may not be fair. In fact, the criteria should have put heavy
negative points for the NPT nuclear weapon countries for not complying with the
Article 6 or proliferating even after joining the treaty. To give an example, even
after joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group China is undermining the institution by
continuously supplying nuclear reactors to Pakistan under its 1986 nuclear
agreement, and several non-proliferation writers and Pakistan put blame on the
India-specific exemptions for it. It is bizarre. A stable and peaceful world
order cannot be achieved on unequal nuclear order.
Dr. Rajiv Nayan is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
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