Hiroshima Report 2014

The Hiroshima Report--Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: 2014" was published on April 7, 2014. 
The Report and summary (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:

Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
Executive Summary (in Japanese and English)

[Op-Ed] Takanori Mikami, "Significance of Ranking Countries for World without Nuclear Weapons"

Since August 6, 1945, Hiroshima's mission has been to educate the world about the cruelty and disaster caused by the use of atomic weapons. Hiroshima has been so successful in their mission that, after almost 70 years since the destruction, atomic weapons have never been used during war. As Nobel laureate and economist, Thomas Schelling, pointed out in his acceptance speech, Hiroshima's legacy has prevented atomic weapons from being used in the world.[1]

However, the surge of terrorist attacks has forced us to change this notion. Human beings may again suffer gigantic destruction and its lingering consequences. Graham Allison, who analyzed the Cuban missile crisis in his book, warned the world about the upcoming threat of nuclear terrorism. Allison is not alone; George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn have also earnestly insisted that the world needs to be free from nuclear weapons facing emerging challenges posed by state and non-state actors.[2]

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 3-(3) Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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A) Minimization of HEU in Civilian Use

HEU has been utilized for civilian purposes through the use of research reactors and isotope production reactors. However, since HEU is suitable for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, if it is removed from a regulatory control without authorization, such as by theft, it becomes possible that non-state actors as well as states can produce nuclear explosive devices. Against this concern, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was commenced in 2004 by the U.S. proposal for the purposes of returning Russian- or U.S.-origin HEU located in civilian sites in the world to its respective origins and converting research reactors to use low enriched uranium (LEU). The Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 upheld this effort as one of the most important actions to be taken.

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 3-(2)Status of Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety Related Conventions, Participation to Nuclear Security Related Initiatives, and Application to Domestic Systems

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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A) Accession Status to Nuclear Security Related Conventions

This report surveys the accession status of each country to the following nuclear security and safety related conventions: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Amendment to CPPNM (CPPNM Amendment), International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), Convention on Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention), Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The results are summarized in Table 3-4.

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 3-(1) The Amount of Fissile Material Usable for Weapons

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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Nuclear security threat is defined as “a person or group of persons with motivation, intention and capability to commit criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities or other acts determined by the State to have an adverse impact on nuclear security.”[1] The IAEA recommends to take a graded approach that takes into account: “the current evaluation of the threat, the relative ‘attractiveness’[2], the nature of the nuclear material and potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear facilities”[3] to decide physical protection requirements. This suggests that the more suitable nuclear and other radioactive material, related nuclear facilities and activities are to achieving certain malicious intentions, the higher the nuclear security risk is, thereby requiring a high-level of protection measures corresponding to the security risk. In a similar way, the larger the consequences of a certain malicious act, the stronger the level of security measures required. 

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] (3) Nuclear Security: Introduction

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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In response to the increasing concern about “loose nukes” resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2011, international efforts to enhance nuclear security have accelerated and nuclear security tools have been greatly reinforced (augmented). In 2005, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted (has not yet entered into force). In 2007, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) entered into force. In 2011, the fifth revision of Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) was issued. In addition, the two Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 provided opportunities for world leaders to show commitment to strengthening nuclear security by declaring and supporting nuclear security approaches to be taken. Similarly, the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in July 2013, served as a platform for participating countries to make official remarks about their respective nuclear security policies at the Ministerial Meeting at the beginning of the conference. These official statements, as well as the membership status of international conventions and implementation status of the measures recommended to take by INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, provide an important overview for assessing the nuclear security performance of each country.   

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(6) Transparency in the peaceful use of nuclear energy

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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In addition to accepting the IAEA safeguards, as described earlier, a state should aim to be fully transparent about its nuclear-related activities and future plans, in order to demonstrate that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. A state that concludes an AP with the IAEA is obliged to provide information on its general plans for the next ten-year period relevant to the development of its nuclear fuel cycle (including nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities). Major countries actively promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy have issued mid- or long-term nuclear development plans, including the construction of nuclear power plants.[1] The international community may be concerned about the possible development of nuclear weapon programs when states conduct nuclear activities without publishing their nuclear development plans (e.g. Israel, North Korea, and Syria), or are engaged in nuclear activities which seem inconsistent with their plans, capabilities and technologies (e.g. Iran).