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A) Accession Status to Nuclear Security Related
Conventions
This report surveys the accession status of
each country to the following nuclear security and safety related conventions: Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Amendment to CPPNM
(CPPNM Amendment), International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), Convention on Nuclear Safety
(Nuclear Safety Convention), Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and Convention on Assistance in the
Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The results are summarized
in Table 3-4.
CPPNM requires its party states to take
appropriate protection measures for international transfer of nuclear material
used for peaceful purposes, and not permit its transfer in the case such
measures are not in place. It also calls for the criminalization of acts
including unauthorized receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal
or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes damage to any person or
property, as well as theft or robbery of nuclear material. It entered into
force in 1987.
CPPNM Amendment greatly expands its scope
by calling for party states to take protection measures against nuclear
facilities and nuclear material in use, storage and transport, and impose
regulations to prevent sabotage against nuclear facilities. It was adopted by
consensus in 2005, but has not yet entered into force as of December 2013.
Nuclear Terrorism Convention (which became effective
in 2007) requires party states to criminalize acts of possession and use of
radioactive material or nuclear explosive devices with malicious intent and against
those seeking to use and damage nuclear facilities in order to cause
radioactive dispersal.
Nuclear Safety Convention is aimed at
ensuring and enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants and became effective
in 1996. The discussion to develop this convention started in response to the
Chernobyl nuclear accident. Its party states are required to take legal and
administrative measures, report to the review committee established under this
convention, and accept peer review in order to ensure the safety of nuclear
power plants under their jurisdiction. Convention on Early Notification of a
Nuclear Accident obligates its party states to immediately report to the IAEA
when a nuclear accident has occurred, including the type, time, and location of
the accident and relevant information. It entered into force in 1986. Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management calls for its member states to take legal and
administrative measures, report to its review committee, and undergo peer
review by other parties, for the purpose of ensuring safety of spent fuel and
radioactive waste. It became effective in 2001. Convention on Assistance in the
Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency establishes the
international framework that enables equipment provision and dispatch of
experts with the goals of preventing nuclear accidents and radioactive
emergencies from exacerbating and minimizing their impact. It entered into
force in 1987. Since these nuclear safety-related conventions impose nuclear
safety measures that serve as protective measures for nuclear security purposes
as well, they are regarded as nuclear security related international
conventions.
Table 3-4 shows the signature and
ratification status of each country to these conventions. The differences from the
findings of last year’s report are that Syria signed the Nuclear Safety
Convention, and that North Korea signed the Convention on Assistance in the
Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
(Table: Signature
and Ratification Status for Major Nuclear Security and Safety Related
Conventions)
B) INFCIRC/225/Rev.5
INFCIRC/225.Rev.5 is IAEA’s recommendation
document without legally binding force for physical protection measures for
nuclear material and related facilities and is, in fact, regarded as an
instrument to set forth international standards with respect to physical
protection of nuclear material and associated facilities. The first edition was
formulated in 1975 as INFCIRC/225, based on “recommendations for physical
protection of nuclear material (1972)”, and has been revised several times and its
latest edition, INFCIRC/225.Rev.5, was published in January 2011. This fifth
edition newly introduces measures that include setting of limited access areas,
graded approaches, the enhancement of defense-in-depth, protection against “Stand-off
Attack”, counter measures against insider threats, fostering nuclear security
culture as a preventive measure against insider threats, and the provision of redundancy
measures to ensure the functions of the central alarm station during an emergency.
Being provided with protective measures in accordance with the recommendation
made by this fifth edition has been encouraged internationally, with a view to
establishing a sufficient nuclear security system.[1] The communique of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 made it
clear by declaring that the all participating states were to make efforts to
take-up these recommended measures.[2] Therefore, the application status of the recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5
can serve as an indicator to evaluate the nuclear security system of each
country. However, because the information on the application status is limited,
this report refers to official statements made available in the Seoul Nuclear
Security Summit, International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global
Efforts organized by the IAEA (hereinafter, referred as IAEA Nuclear Security Conference),
and other opportunities to evaluate the national nuclear security stance and
performance of each state.
Application
Status of Each Country of the Measures Recommended in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5[3]
The following part
summarizes the measures taken by some countries to accommodate the recommended
measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
In the field of the development of legal
instruments, Japan amended its ministerial ordinances in 2011 and 2012, in
order to apply the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, such as the setting of
limited access areas and the enhancement of vital functions located outside
protected areas. France, Belgium, Switzerland, Brazil, and the U.S. have
declared that they have also established legal instruments based on the INFCIRC
225/Rev.5. In addition, Turkey has expressed that it is currently working to
develop laws and regulations in line with the recommended measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
In the area of strengthening
the physical protection measures, Australia and South Africa are trying to take
measures corresponding to INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5, as well as Indonesia, Sweden, and
China, who have stated that they are in the process of applying measures
including the enhancement of physical protection systems, as per INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
In response to the intrusion incident to the Y-12 National Security Complex in
2011, the U.S. has stated that it has strenghtened physical protection measures
at 175 facilities in the country that handle radioactive material and has
undertaken the implementation of force-on-force exercises.[4]
In addition, Mexico and the UAE have expressed that they are also working
towards the application of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 measures through participation in related
workshops. Belgium has updated its DBT, which is to serve as a basis for the
establishment of its nuclear security requirements, in order to respond to new
threats identified by INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
As for the measures against sabotage, The Netherlands
has stated that it started to apply the risk based categorization for nuclear
material and implemented protection measures according to this categorization
in January 2013. Republic of Korea (ROK) has also expressed that it is working toward applying
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 measures such as protection measures in accordance with
nuclear material categorization. Netherland has declared that it has
established its national database for category I and II nuclear material.
With regard to cyber-terrorism, the Netherlands
has made it clear that its DBT addresses the threat of cyber-terrorism and that
its transport security is in line with the recommendations of
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. ROK has also expressed its use of GPS for real time surveillance
as transport security measures. Mexico has declared that it has recommended
measures for transport in place.
In the field of protection measures against
insider threats, Indonesia has introduced the “two person rule” and, in
addition, is working actively to nourish nuclear security culture. In March
2013, it was the first country in the world to conduct the self-assessment of nuclear
security culture, in cooperation with the IAEA. Sweden obligates licensees to
make efforts to promote nuclear security culture and applies its
self-assessment as a regulatory requirement. In addition, Russia and Germany
have expressed that they are working to foster a nuclear security culture in
their countries through participation in related workshops.
(Table: Application Status of and
Efforts for Recommended Measures of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 on Each)
(Drafted by Kazuko Hamada, Japan Atomic Energy Agency)
[1] The IAEA
is engaged in conducting outreach activities of workshops and regional training
courses with the purpose to assist states to taking the measures recommended by
this INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. Similarly, the U.S. and Japan are also making efforts
to promote the understanding of these recommended measures through outreach
activities such as workshops.
[3] Progress statements made in the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. https://www.nss2014.com/en/nss-2014/reference-documents.
[4] It is defined as “a performance test of the physical protection
system that uses designated trained personnel in the role of an adversary force
to simulate an attack consistent with the threat or the design basis threat.”
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 recommends to conduct performance tests that include force-on-force
exercises at least annually. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “ Nuclear
Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear
Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5),” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, 2011.
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