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A) Minimization of HEU in Civilian Use
HEU has been
utilized for civilian purposes through the use of research reactors and isotope
production reactors. However, since HEU is suitable for the manufacture of
nuclear explosive devices, if it is removed from a regulatory control without
authorization, such as by theft, it becomes possible that non-state actors as
well as states can produce nuclear explosive devices. Against this concern, the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was commenced in 2004 by the U.S.
According to the
report of the Global Security Partnership, 82 research reactors had been converted
to LEU use, and 235kg of HEU from Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Poland had been
returned to Russia, while 12kg of HEU from Mexico had been returned to the U.S.
during the period October 2012 to September 2013.[1]
At the Seoul Nuclear
Security Summit and other occasions, the following progresses and commitments on
the minimization of HEU were expressed:
Ø China: Based on the agreement with the U.S.
in 2010, it is conducting the conversion of research reactors to use LEU.
Ø France: It is working closely with other
countries for the technology development for the conversion to use LEU.
Ø Russia: It has converted 1,320kg of
unirradiated HEU to LEU since 2010. It is planning to accept HEU from Uzbekistan
and Ukraine. In addition, in cooperation with the U.S. it is conducting the technology
development and feasibility study for LEU conversion of six research reactors
at Kurchatov Atomic Energy Research Institute.
Ø United States: It has converted 10.5tons of
U.S. HEU and 2tons of Russian HEU to be LEU and has been supporting the return
of 400kg of HEU from 10 countries to their respective origins.
Ø Israel: It has returned HEU to the U.S.
Ø Austria: It has returned HEU.[2]
Ø Australia: It has shut down the research
reactors that used HEU and returned all spent fuel to its origin. It has
developed technology of radiopharmaceutical production using LEU. It returned
exessive HEU to the U.S. in 2013.
Ø Belgium: As a leading producer of
radioactive isotope in the world, it is cooperating with the U.S., France, and the
Netherlands in minimizing the use of HEU. It has exchanged diplomatic notes
with the U.S. about the conversion of the BR2 research reactor and the
processing facility of the National Institute for Radioelements (I.R.E.) and is
making preparation efforts to return its HEU to the U.S. in 2014.
Ø Canada: It returned HEU to
the U.S. in 2012 as a subsequent effort made in 2010. It is planning to finish
the return of all HEU by 2018. It has financially contributed $8,000,000 to the
conversion activities to use LEU in Mexico and Vietnam.
Ø Kazakhstan: It has returned
HEU of the WR-K research reactor to Russia and is currently working on its
conversion to LEU use. The conversion is expected to be completed in 2014.
Ø ROK: It is conducting technology
development for the conversion to use LEU and is cooperating with other countries
for the application of this technology.
Ø Mexico: It completed the conversion to use
LEU and returned the all HEU in 2012.
Ø Netherland: It has completed the conversion
of its research reactors to use LEU.
Ø South Africa: It has completed the conversion to use LEU of major
supply facilities of molybdenum-99 and returned HEU to the U.S.
Ø Sweden: It converted the all research
reactors to use LEU in the 1990s. It is currently contributing to the
international effort of the minimization of HEU use.
B) Prevention of Illicit Trafficking
Countries with nuclear material need to
effectively implement measures ranging from strict controls at both state and
facility levels—including nuclear material accounting and control—in order to
detect and prevent illicit transfers of nuclear material to other states or
non-state actors. The Communiqué of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit lists
those measures, including the advancement of technical capabilities in the
fields of national inspection and detection of nuclear and other radioactive
material at the borders, further utilization of legal, intelligence and
financial tools to effectively prosecute offenses, participation in the IAEA Incident
and Trafficking Database (ITDB) program, provision of necessary information
relating to nuclear and other radioactive material outside of regulatory
control, and sharing of information on individuals involved in trafficking
offenses with INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization.
Established in 1995, the IAEA ITDB is the
database on incidents related to unauthorized possession, illicit trafficking,
illegal dispersal of radioactive material, and discovery of nuclear and other
radioactive material out of regulatory control. By providing and sharing
information of relevant incidents, participating countries are expected to
serve as international surveillance against illicit trafficking and strengthen
their efforts for its prevention, and for nuclear security performance as a
whole. As of December 2012, 120 countries have joined the ITDB; all the surveyed
countries except for Syria, Egypt, and North Korea participate in it.
A total of 2,331 incidents have been
reported from 1995 until the end of 2012. In 2012 alone, a total of 160[3] incidents were reported. The breakdown of incidents in 2012 is as
follows.[4]
Ø 17 incidents of “illegal possession of and attempts to sell nuclear
material or radioactive sources”,
Ø 24 incidents of “thefts or losses of radioactive sources”, and
Ø 119 incidents of “discoveries of uncontrolled material, unauthorized
movement or storage of nuclear material, radioactive sources and/or radioactive
contaminated material.”
The detail of information on incidents and
illicit trafficking is not published so as not to discourage participating
countries to report related incident(s). Therefore, as it is not possible to
assess the involvement of the surveyed countries, this report considers only
their respective participation status as an index.
Other preventive measures against illicit
trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material include the development
of legal instruments for export control and detection capability, such as the
installation of sensing devices for radiological material at national borders.
The following describes some of efforts taken as preventive measures against
illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material:
Ø India: It updated its list of dual-use items in 2013 in accordance
with the Guideline II of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Ø Israel: It has established a legal instrument for illegal transfer
prevention. Under the U.S.-led Megaports Initiative, it shares its experience
in countering illicit trafficking with others.
Ø Pakistan: It has revised its controlled list to strengthen its export
control. It is working to install Special Nuclear Material Portals at major entrance
and exit points, as measures for deterrence, detection, and prevention of
illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material.
Ø Brazil: It has amended its legal instrument against illicit
trafficking. It is providing training for border guards of the Mercosur[5] states on prevention, detection and response of illicit transfer of
nuclear and other radiological material and sharing relevant information and
best practices with them.
Ø Mexico: It conducts capacity building programs to develop the laws
and regulations of export control of dual-use items and enhance export control
capability. It has improved the capabilities for detection of nuclear and other
radiological material at five ports under the U.S.-led Megaports Initiative.
Ø Sweden: It organized the Second INTERPOL Radiological and Nuclear
Trafficking and Terrorism Analysis Conference in 2012.
Ø UAE: It has established legal instruments, including the control
list for export control. It has developed enhanced control capabilities at
ports, including the installation of detection equipment as well as the provision
of personnel training through bilateral assistance programs, including the Megaports
initiative.
Table 3-6 shows the implementation status
of the minimization of HEU for peaceful purposes and measures for the
prevention of illegal transfer of nuclear material and other radiological
material based on official statements made at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit
or other opportunities.
(Table: The implementation status of
the minimization of HEU for peaceful purposes and measures for the prevention
of illegal transfer)
C) Acceptance of International Nuclear Security Review
Missions
In order to support the development of the nuclear
security system and capabilities, the IAEA provides advisory services such as
the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and the International
Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) to its member states. Upon the
request of a member state, the INSServ provides recommendations to improve a
broad spectrum of nuclear security activities of the state by reviewing its
nuclear security system and requirements. Also upon the request of a member state,
the IPPAS provides recommendations to improve the physical protection system of
nuclear material, associated facilities, and transport systems of the state. As
IPPAS reviews a state’s nuclear security system in detail with a particular
focus on the state’s physical protection system, it is regarded as an in-depth
review service compared to INSServ. In IPPAS missions, an IPPAS team consisting
of physical protection experts organized by the IAEA visits government
organizations and nuclear facilities in a state, reviews the physical
protection system of the facility in detail, and conducts hearing investigations,
in order to assess whether or not the reviewed physical protection system is in
line with the recommendations of the IAEA INFCIRC/225 and to provide advice
where necessary for its improvement.
Because the IPPAS is a service to review
the details of the physical protection system that include sensitive
information of a requesting state, it is expected to greatly contribute to the
enhancement of the physical protection system of the state in particular and
its nuclear security performance in general. Therefore, the acceptance of the IPPAS
indicates that the state is seriously working to strengthen its nuclear
security system.
Since the IPPAS was initiated in 1996, 56
IPPAS missions have been conducted in 37 states (see Table 3-8). In 2013, Romania
received the follow-up mission of the IPPAS, and Australia, Hungary, and the
U.S. received the IPPAS.
D) Technology Development ―Nuclear
Forensics
Nuclear forensics is the technological
method for the investigation of nuclear and other radiological material that
has been removed without authorization from regulatory control and seized by a
law enforcement authority. The role of nuclear forensics is to investigate the
original location, history, and transport path of the seized material, and the
intent of its removal, by analyzing its composition and physical and chemical
form. It is considered as one of the key technologies to complement nuclear
security efforts. Nuclear forensics activities include the categorization and
characterization of a seized material and the interpretation of their results
that includes the comparison of the results with a database and numerical
simulation.
(Table: Nuclear forensics
capabilities that were reported at the ITWG-17)
In the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010,
international cooperation to build a nuclear forensics capability of each
country was recommended.[6] Subsequently, in the communique of the Nuclear Security Summit in
2012, the importance of international cooperation in developing nuclear
forensics capacity was reaffirmed.[7] As such an international cooperation initiative, the Nuclear
Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) was established in 1996
for the purpose of addressing the issue of illegal transfers following the end
of the Cold War. The ITWG serves as the platform to support the technological
development and sharing of nuclear forensic methods.
According to the reports made at the
ITWG-17 (Table 3-7: Nuclear forensics capabilities of surveyed countries
reported at the ITWG-17), France, the U.K., the U.S., Australia, Canada, Japan,
ROK, Sweden, and Switzerland are currently working for the development of
nuclear forensics capability. Other than these countries, the European
Commission’s Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC), as EU’s effort, is conducting the
characterization and interpretation of nuclear and other radioactive material
seized in EU countries. Its Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), located
in Germany, is a main laboratory for its nuclear forensics activities. The Netherlands
is carrying out a program to promote the international cooperation on
technology development of nuclear forensics. In this regard, it has established
a website to share the information of each country’s nuclear forensics
activities, aiming to harmonize their activities, and share best practice and a
glossary of nuclear forensics. The country also organized an international
table-top exercise of nuclear forensics in 2012.
E) Capacity Building and Support Activities
In response to increased awareness about
the importance of nuclear security capacity building and international
cooperation in this area, many participating countries at the Washington and
Seoul Nuclear Security Summits reported their intentions to establish or
support the establishment of Centers of Excellence (COE) for nuclear security training.
These states include Brazil China France India Japan South Korea Russia South Africa Pakistan Switzerland U.K. U.S. France Sweden
Of particular note, Kazakhstan established the
Kazakhstan Regional Training Centre to foster nuclear security culture, in
cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). It is currently providing
training on nuclear material accounting and control, the physical protection of
nuclear material, and countermeasures against trafficking. France is offering
nuclear security training through its Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear
Security (IRSN) and cooperating with India’s Global Center for Nuclear Energy
Partnership (GCNEP) in the area of nuclear security and research development. In
cooperation with the U.S. DOE, China is currently establishing State Nuclear
Security Technology Center (SNSTC). It is scheduled to start its capacity
building activities for domestic participants and Asian countries from 2015.
ROK is also in the process of establishing the International Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Security Academy (INSA) with the support of the U.S. DOE. It is expected to
be completed in February 2014. After its completion, it will provide training
on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security matters, both nationally and
internationally. Japan, in cooperation with the U.S. DOE, established the Integrated
Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security (ISCN) at the Japan
Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), and is currently providing training and support
activities in the areas of nuclear security and safeguards.
In spite of these remarkable developments,
some have pointed out the risk of overlap and redundancies in the activities of
these centers if, with similar objectives and targets, they carry out their
training activities in the same region without prior coordination. To reduce
such duplication and to facilitate exchange of experts, information as well as
training material, the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and
Support Centers (NSTC・NSSC) was established in 2012 under the leadership of the IAEA.
Through its annual meeting and the meetings of three working groups (WG1:
Harmonization and cooperation, WG2: Best practice, WG3: Information
management/other emerging issues), the NSTC・NSSC is expected to serve as the platform on which participating
countries can improve the ability and effectiveness of their capacity building
activities.
One
of the purposes of this NSTC・NSSC initiative is to standardize the quality of nuclear security training.
To this end, the IAEA is cooperating with its member States for the development
of training curriculum for nuclear security. As a part of this effort, Brazil,
in cooperation with the IAEA, is establishing the Nuclear
Security Support Center. In the same way, Pakistan established its Nuclear
Security Training Center and is currently providing nuclear security training,
mainly to the staff of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority. In addition, the Netherlands,
in cooperation
with the IAEA, has since 2012 been providing a masters
program in nuclear security for IAEA member states at the Reactor Institute Delft
of Delft University of Technology.
Enhancing the effectiveness of nuclear
security training by harmonizing the activities of COEs is also one of the
purposes of the NSTC・NSSC initiative. In this regard, there
is some concern that the content and targeted participants of the nuclear
security training courses of Japan (ISCN), ROK (INSA), and China (SNSTC) will overlap
or be duplicated, and thus, possibly undermining the overall effectiveness of
nuclear security training. Against this concern, an effort to achieve the
harmonization of these three COEs began in 2012 under the initiative of the
IAEA. Because ROK’s INSA and China’s SNSTC have not yet been established,[8] this effort has thus far been
limited to information sharing about their respective activities and plans to
date. But, differentiating the training contents of each COE by characterizing
them, and harmonizing their training schedules to avoid overlaps, are currently
being considered as possibilities for the future.
F) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund
In March 2002 the IAEA Board of Governors
approved the first three-year Nuclear Security Plan as a program to combat the
risk of nuclear terrorism. The third Nuclear Security Plan covering the period
2010-2013[9] was approved in August 2009 and has been implemented.[10] Moreover, the IAEA established the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), a
voluntary funding mechanism to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear
terrorism, and has called for member states’ contributions.[11]
According to the IAEA Annual Report 2012, 19
States (including China, France, Russia, the U.S., the U.K., India, Canada, Germany,
ROK, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden) and the EU made extra
budgetary funding. The total revenue of the NSF amounted to some €25 million in
2012.[12]
Table 3-8 shows only the countries that made funding contributions in 2012.
G) Participation in International Efforts
The establishment of “Global Partnership
against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (G8GP) was
agreed in the G8 Kananaskis Summit in 2002. In addition to the G8 member states
(including France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., the U.S. and Russia), donor
participants (Australia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, etc.) have
participated in the G8GP and carried out various projects, in particular
denuclearization cooperation in Russia. The membership of the G8GP had expanded
to 27 states at the end of 2013.[13]
The G8 Summit in St. Petersburg in July
2006 agreed to establish the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
(GICNT), proposed by Russia and the U.S. Participating states are to make
efforts to fulfill the eight principles, including the improvement of physical
protection measures for nuclear and other radiological material, the enhancement
of security of civilian nuclear facilities and of detection capability of illegal
transfers, and the prevention of financial assistance to terrorists upon the
adoption of “the Statement of Principles”. Since the first meeting of the GICNT
in Morocco in October 2006, its membership has expanded to be 85 states (including
Australia, China, France, Russia, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, ROK, Pakistan,
Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.) and 4 international organizations
as official observers.[14]
On the one hand, the aforementioned
initiatives of the acceptance of the International Physical Protection Advisory
Service (IPPAS) by the IAEA, the effort for nuclear forensics, and the
commitment to nuclear security capacity-building and support, are considered to
contribute to the improvement of nuclear security performances of surveyed
countries, and thus, demonstrate their respective nuclear security system. On
the other hand, the contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and the
participation in the G8 Global Partnership (G8GP) and the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) indicate the commitment to nuclear security by
each country and can be used for an overall evaluation of each country’s
nuclear security system.
(Table 3-8 below shows the participation
status in and effort for these nuclear security initiatives.)
(Drafted by Kazuko Hamada, Japan Atomic Energy Agency)
[1] Emily Mella, “Reported Accomplishments of Selected Threat Reduction
and Nonproliferation Programs by Agency for Fiscal Year 2012,” Global Security
Partnership, August 2013.
[2] NTI, “Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and
Action: Second Edition,” January 2014, p.40.
[3] Although the total number of the incidents in 2012 is written as 147
in the IAEA Annual Report 2012, it should be 160 as the total of the three
breakdowns and thus, “160” is used in this report.
[4] IAEA Annual Report 2012, p. 69.
[5] This is the customs union of South American countries.
[6] The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary “Work Plan of the Washington Nuclear
Security Summit,” April 13, 2010.
[8] South Korea’s INSA is planned to be established in February 2014.
China’s SNSTC is scheduled to be completed in 2015.
[9] The Nuclear Security Plan for 2014-2017 was approved in September
2013.
[10] GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18, 17 August 2009.
[11] The IAEA has an unstable budget situation. Despite its growing role in nuclear security,
the Agency is obliged to depend on extra-budgetary contributions, which are not
necessarily granted from one year to another.
[12] “IAEA Annual Report 2012,” p. 71.
[13] The
followings are partner states (surveyed states are underlined). Core partners: The
U.S., Canada, Germany, France, Italy, The U.K.,
Japan, Russia, The EU. Other partner states: Australia, Belgium,
The Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, ROK,
Mexico, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, The
Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine. Partner states
that are considering participation in it: Argentina, Austria, Brazil,
Chile, China, India, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, UAE, Jordan.
[14] See the
U.S. Department of State homepage, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c37083.htm.
As for the GICNT’s key multilateral meeting, workshops and exercises, see also the
U.S. Department of State homepage, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/172982.pdf.
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