(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Conclusion of the IAEA Safeguards Agreements
Under Article III-1 of the NPT, “[e]ach Non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The basic structure and content of the safeguards agreement are specified in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). To date, 12 NPT NNWS have yet to conclude CSAs with the IAEA. An NPT NNWS or any other state may also conclude a protocol additional to its safeguards agreement, or the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP). As of September 2013, 116 NPT NNWS have ratified the APs. New ratifying countries in 2013 were Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Vietnam.
The IAEA Secretariat can draw the so-called “broader conclusion” that “all nuclear material in the State has remained in peaceful activities” when the Agency finds no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and undeclared nuclear material or activities in that country. The IAEA can draw such a conclusion in a credible manner only in a state with both the CSA and the AP in force. Subsequently, the IAEA implements integrated safeguards defined as the “optimized combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under [CSAs] and [APs], to maximize effectiveness and efficiency within available resources.”
The current status of the signature and ratification of the CSAs and the APs and the implementation of the integrated safeguards by the NPT NNWS studied in this project is presented in the following table.
B) Compliance with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement
Under Article XII-C of the Statute of the IAEA, the IAEA “Board shall report the non-compliance [with safeguards agreements] to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.” Up to now, three cases of non-compliance have been reported to the UN Security Council and have yet to be solved: North Korea, Iran and Syria.
With regard to North Korea, it asked the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance from the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and to leave the country in April 2009. Since then, no safeguards measures in North Korea have been implemented by the IAEA.
As for Syria, the international community as well as the IAEA has suspected that the Dair Alzour site, which was destroyed by an Israeli air raid in September 2007, was a clandestinely constructed, undeclared nuclear reactor. In August 2013, the IAEA reported that “the Agency [had] not received any new information from Syria or other Member States that would have an impact on the Agency’s assessment of the nature of the destroyed building at the Dair Alzour site.” The IAEA also “informed Syria that…the 2013 physical inventory verification at the [Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)] would be postponed until the security conditions had sufficiently improved.” Meanwhile, Syria declared the small amount of nuclear material at the MNSR.
Iran has accepted the IAEA inspections on its declared nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, under the CSA. However, as indicated again in the report by the IAEA Director-General in August 2013, “[w]hile the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and [Location Outside Facilities (LOFs)] declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.” This report also pointed out that: “[t]he Agency has not been able to begin substantive work with Iran on resolving the outstanding issues, including those related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme”; and “Iran continues not to implement modified Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, notwithstanding statements it has made in relation to the construction of new research reactors, new uranium enrichment facilities and new power reactors.”
Iran, on the other hand, sent an explanatory note to the IAEA on the IAEA report, and strongly criticized that “[t]he report [was] not balanced and factual…[and] the claims and baseless allegations against Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities as contained in the DG report…[were] unprofessional, unfair, illegal and politicized.” Furthermore, Iran states in the explanatory note that “[a]s the result of Iran’s proactive cooperation all outstanding issues…[had been] resolved by 2008 and reported by the former Director General to the Board of Governors.”
However, the relationship between Iran and the IAEA has gradually changed after the inauguration of President Rouhani. They concluded the Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation at the meeting in November 2013 and agreed, among other issues, the following points:
Ø Iran and the IAEA will cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues. It is foreseen that Iran's cooperation will include providing the IAEA with timely information about its nuclear facilities and in regard to the implementation of transparency measures.
Ø The IAEA agreed to continue to take into account Iran's security concerns including through the use of managed access and the protection of confidential information.
Ø As a first step, Iran and the IAEA agreed to the practical measures listed in the attached Annex. Iran will provide the access and information within three months from the date of this Statement. The IAEA will report to the Board of Governors on progress in the implementation of these measures.
In the attached Annex of the Joint Statement, the following measures are listed: providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas, and to the Heavy Water Production Plant near Arak; clarification of the announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities; and further clarification of the announcement made by Iran with respect to laser enrichment technology. However, the pending matter of how to handle the Parchin site was not listed in the Joint Statement.
In the Joint Plan of Action concluded between the E3+3 and Iran in November 2013, the following measures for enhancing monitoring as the elements of a first step were agreed:
Ø Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran’s plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material
Ø Submission of an updated design information questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 at Arak
Ø Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the IR-40
Ø Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz
Ø IAEA inspector managed access to: centrifuge assembly workshops; centrifuge rotor production workshop and storage facilities; and uranium mines and mills
Despite the significance of the Joint Plan of Action, the E3+3 and Iran have yet to agree on measures for solving certain “outstanding issues,” particularly the dispute regarding the Parchin site. On this point, one U.S. expert analyzed that “Iran appear[ed] to be in the final stages of modifying the suspected high explosive test site at the Parchin complex, having recently asphalted large sections of the site,” which makes it difficult to conduct any IAEA inspection for verifying whether Iran conducted nuclear weapons-related activities.
In June 2013, it was reported that the classified IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report was leaked. According to the media source citing this Report, the following issues, inter alia, were included:
Ø For 71 of 159 member states, the IAEA "was not able to get timely responses to agency requests for, or clarification of, safeguards relevant information", without naming them.
Ø Brazil, China and Georgia were among the 159-member countries that most consistently responded late to IAEA requests.
Ø The IAEA conducted 1,962 on-site inspections in 2012, with 215 taking place in Iran.
Ø Inspections in Iran consumed over 12 percent of the IAEA budget for the safeguards.
Ø IAEA investigators spent 1,356 calendar days in Iran last year visiting its nuclear facilities (180 calendar days in France, 16 calendar days in Russia, and 50 calendar days in the United States).
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
 The 12 NNWS either have nuclear material in small quantity or conduct no nuclear activity.
 See, for example, GOV/2012/36-GC(56)/11, 30 August 2012.
 GOV/2013/41, 28 August 2013.
 GOV/2013/40, 28 August 2013.
 INFCIRC/854, 26 September 2013.
 “Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation,” signed by the IAEA and Iran, 11 November 2013, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2013/prn201321.html.
 David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Update on the Parchin Site,” ISIS Report, August 22, 2013, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/august-22-2013-update-on-the-parchin-site-by-david-albright-and-robert-avag/8#images.
 Jonathan Tirone, “UN Atomic Agency Says 70 Countries Join Iran Shirking Duty,” Bloomberg, June 6, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/un-atomic-agency-says-70-countries-joined-iran-in-shirking-duty.html; “Iran not U.N. Nuclear Watchdog's Only Headache, Report Shows,” Reuters, June 7, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/07/us-nuclear-iaea-safeguards-idUSBRE9560OS20130607; Mark Hibbs, “Safeguards in the Spotlight,” Arms Control Wonk, 9 June 2013, http://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1878/safeguards-in-the-spotlight.