(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Establishment and implementation of the national implementation system
Japan serves as a member of all international export control regimes, including the NSG, and it has established the relevant national implementation systems (legislative measures and implementation systems). Japan implements an advanced export control system enforcing two types of controls: Catch-all Control and List Control. Under the Japanese export control system, all countries are subject to the WMD Catch-all Control, except for countries belonging to the four international export control regimes and having solid export controls in place, including WMD Catch-all Controls. Japan calls these countries the “white countries.” Currently, Japan designates 26 white countries. Regarding states surveyed in this project, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States are “white countries.” Like Japan, these countries also have their national implementation systems in place and have implemented effective export controls regarding nuclear-related items and technologies.
These countries have actively made efforts for strengthening export controls. For example, Japan held the 20th Asian Export Control Seminar in February 2013. The purpose of this annual Seminar is to “[step] up Asian and international efforts toward non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction (WMD) by raising common awareness of the importance of such non-proliferation and export control over such weapons across Asia and by consolidating the export control capabilities there.” Persons in charge of export control from 15 Asian countries and regions, major Western countries, the UN Security Council, and 4 multilateral export control regimes participated in the 2013 Seminar. Japan also hosted the 9th Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) in March and 10th ASTOP in October, at which senior level government officials in charge of non-proliferation policies from the ASEAN member countries, Australia, Canada, South Korea, New Zealand, the United States and Japan exchanged their views on non-proliferation issues, including the efforts by each country for strengthening strategic trade control system. In June, the United States and the EU hosted the International Export Control Cooperation and Outreach Dialogue. Representatives from 34 countries and administrative regions, as well as experts from industry and nongovernmental organizations, discussed how countries can reduce the threat of WMD proliferation through cooperation to strengthen strategic trade controls.
The NPDI also proposed the following measures on bolstering export controls at the 2013 NPT PrepCom:
Ø Encouraging States parties to share best practices and lessons learned regarding building, implementing and reinforcing effective domestic export control systems and practices, including the effective use of catch-all controls;
Ø Requiring ongoing compliance by States with their IAEA safeguards obligations as a condition of nuclear equipment, material and technology supply by States parties;
Ø Reaffirming the principle that States parties should require the conclusion and implementation of a Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) as well as an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) with IAEA as a condition for new supply arrangements with non-nuclear-weapon States; and
Ø Calling on States parties to adhere to the multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee in developing their domestic export control systems.
Among other countries surveyed in this project, Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey are participating governments of the NSG. These countries have set up their export control systems, including Catch-all Controls.
As pointed out in the Hiroshima Report 2013, concerns have been expressed over Russia’s and China’s implementation of export controls. There are few indications that their implementation has significantly improved. Although, as mentioned later, China was reported to have implemented more stringent export controls vis-à-vis North Korea after the North’s nuclear test in February 2013, questions remain as to whether China is conducting adequate and strict enforcement of export controls.
As for other NNWS, the UAE’s strategic trade control legislation in 2008 stipulates a catch-all control, but it is not clear how effectively the UAE implements export controls. Indonesia has yet to prepare a list of dual-use items and technologies, or catch-all control. Regarding the Egyptian export control activities, no reliable information could be found.
Three non-NPT states have also set up national export control systems, including Catch-all Controls. Some member countries have shown support for India’s membership in the NSG. However, a final decision as to whether the NSG invites India as a member has not yet been made. India’s Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai stated that it is “committed to maintaining the highest export control standards,” and announced that “the national SCOMET (special chemicals, organisms, materials, equipment and technologies) list has been updated to be on par with the current [NSG] and [MTCR] lists.”
Pakistan, according to its report to the UN 1540 Committee, has made efforts for enhancing its export control systems including the introduction of a catch-all control system, after the revelation of the existence of the nuclear black-market (A. Q. Khan network). Pakistan also argues that its “export control regime is compatible with the guidelines of the MTCR, NSG and AG.” However, it is still questionable how robust or successfully implemented such export control systems are in practice.
At the time of writing, the status of export control implementation by North Korea, Iran and Syria is not clear. Indeed, it is widely assumed that these three states have actively cooperated in the proliferation of WMD and missiles. In July 2013 when the ceremony of the 60th anniversary of the Korean War ceasefire was held, Iranian military delegations visited Pyongyang, and North’s leader Kim Jong-un and the Syrian delegations met—appealing their close relationship. In August, it was reported that Mohammad Ali Jafari, Commander of the Iranian Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, met with the North Korean delegations who visited Tehran for attending the inaugural ceremony of the new Iranian President, and that they committed to continuation of cooperation in nuclear and missile developments. While the situations regarding WMD non-proliferation in the Middle East have been significantly changing, including Syria’s accession to the CWC and Iran’s positive attitudes toward solving its nuclear issues, it remains unclear how such changes will impact upon regional relationships and issues of proliferation cooperation.
B) Requiring the Conclusion of the Additional Protocol for Nuclear Export
As mentioned earlier, some of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements that Japan and the United States concluded recently with other countries make the conclusion of the AP a prerequisite for their cooperation with respective partner states.
The NPDI “reaffirm[ed] the principle that States parties should require the conclusion and implementation of a Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) as well as an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) with IAEA as a condition for new supply arrangements with non-nuclear-weapon States” in a working paper issued at the 2013 NPT PrepCom. Japan stated that it “call[ed] on all states to apply this safeguards standard (i.e. a comprehensive safeguards agreement reinforced by an additional protocol) as a condition for supplying nuclear material, equipment and technology to a recipient country, and to incorporate this condition in their civil nuclear cooperation agreements.” The Vienna Group of Ten (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) also made a similar proposal at the PrepCom.
C) Implementation of the UNSCR on North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues
With regard to Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, the UN Member States are obliged to implement measures set out in the relevant resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, including embargos on nuclear-, other WMD-, and ballistic missile-related items, material, and technologies. One of the international community’s concerns has been a question of whether China has adequately implemented the necessary measures for the prevention vis-à-vis North Korea, though recognizing that it is too optimistic to expect a “perfect” prevention of illicit trafficking.
After the North’s nuclear test in February 2013, it was reported that China seemed to alter its stance toward North Korea, though cautiously. According to a statement by the Bank of China, the North’s Foreign Trade Bank was instructed to close its operations, and that its transactions with the Foreign Trade Bank had been halted in May. It was also reported that China’s other state-owned banks—China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China—suspended any business with North Korean financial institutions. Furthermore, China’s Ministry of Commerce released a 236-page list of technologies and goods, usable for WMD and missile production, banned from export to North Korea in September. This embargo is to be implemented by the Commerce Ministry along with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China’s Custom Administration, and the China Atomic Energy Authority. Despite such positive announcements, it is still unclear whether and to what extent China has implemented those measures adequately and strictly.
In June 2013, the Panels of Experts, established pursuant to Resolutions 1874 (2009) and 1929 (2010) and reporting to their relevant UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, published reports on their findings and recommendations about the implementation of these resolutions. The reports highlight the Iranian and North Korean attempts to import and export proscribed items in violation of the resolutions and the efforts of the international community to prevent illicit trafficking. Regarding the North Korean case, the Panel reported, inter alia: missile-related shipment seized by South Korea in May 2012; prevention of an attempt by officials of North Koera to obtain missile technology in Ukraine in June 2012; transportable-erector-launchers (transferred from China) for a KN-08 long-range ballistic missile, observed during the April 2012 military parade. The reports also pointed out that North Korea and Iran continued to seek items for their prohibited activities from abroad, using multiple and increasingly complex procurement methods.
In addition to the cases included in the reports, the following cases of illicit trafficking were reported in the news during 2013:
Ø In April, based on the U.S. intelligence, Turkish officials searched a Libyan-registered vessel Al En Ti Sar, en route from North Korea to Syria, and seized 1,400 rifles and pistols and some 30,000 bullets as well as gas masks apparently for chemical protection
Ø In July, the Panamanian government interdicted a North Korean cargo vessel Chong Chon Gang, and seized two air-defense missile batteries, missile parts, and engines for Mig-21 fighter jet.
Ø In February, Iran was reported to have attempted buying 100,000 ring-shaped magnets, usable for centrifuge machines, from China.
Ø In March, German and Turkish security forces arrested seven people suspected of smuggling nuclear-related items to Iran.
Ø Iran imported a high grade of refined alumina ore from several European countries, including Germany and France, that Tehran could be using to make armor parts and missile components.
D) Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
As of June 2013, a total of 102 countries—including 21 member states of the Operational Expert Group (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Turkey, the U.K., the U.S. and so on) as well as Belgium, Israel, Kazakhstan, Switzerland, Sweden, the UAE and so on—have expressed their support for the PSI’s principles and objectives, and have participated and cooperated in PSI-related activities.
In May 2013, 72 countries attended the tenth anniversary of the PSI, with a high-level political meeting in Warsaw. In the Joint Statements issued by the four sessions— Enhancing Critical Interdiction Capabilities and Practices; Ensuring a Robust Initiative; Expanding Strategic Communications; and Strengthening Authorities for Action— the participating countries agreed to take specific actions.
The interdiction activities actually carried out within the framework of the PSI are often based on information provided by intelligence agencies; therefore, most of them are classified. However, several cases of attempts to prevent shipments of WMD-related material to North Korea and Iran have been reported. Additionally, participating states have endorsed the PSI statement of interdiction principles and endeavored to reinforce their capabilities to interdict WMD through exercises and outreach activities. In 2012, the UAE and the United States jointly hosted the PSI exercise, named Leading Edge 2013, from January-February 2013. 28 countries, including XXXXX, participated in this exercise.
E) Civil nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT
In September 2008, the NSG agreed to grant India a waiver, allowing nuclear trade with the state. Since then, some countries have sought to move forward civil nuclear cooperation with India, including conclusion of nuclear cooperation agreements.
As of November 2012, Canada, France, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Russia and the United States have concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with India. However, it has been pointed out that India’s liability law—which obliges not only nuclear reactor operators but also nuclear suppliers to be liable in case of a nuclear accident—poses one of the obstacles to proceeding with actual civil nuclear cooperation or concluding nuclear cooperation agreements with India. Due to this issue, an Indian-Russian project to construct two nuclear power reactors has not made progress.
Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom continue to negotiate with India on respective bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, but they have yet to be concluded. Japan demands a clause be written into any agreement that would nullify the accord if India conducts another nuclear-weapons test, but India has not accepted it. Australia, under a new Liberal-National government led by conservative parties since September 2013, seems ready to explore the possibility to move forward with conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement, which will enable Australia to export uranium to India. Still, it is also understood that “Australia [will not] ease off its demands for strong safeguards in any trade deal that guarantees its uranium will not be diverted to India’s nuclear-weapons program, according to specialists.”
The NSG has yet to conclude whether India should be invited as a member or not. NWS, except China, have supported India’s participation in the NSG. The United Kingdom presented a paper prepared ahead of the NSG’s annual meeting in June 2013, arguing for their position on this issue. Australia also informed its support for India's full membership of the NSG. On the other hand, some European countries and Japan are considered to be unenthusiastic about India’s participation, because of norms on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation under the current nuclear non-proliferation regime, and so on. China strongly opposes the proposal that India alone becomes an NSG member, implying that Pakistan should be treated the same as India.
Meanwhile, China has been criticized because its export of two nuclear power reactors to Pakistan, agreed in April 2010, may constitute a violation of the NSG guidelines. Beijing has claimed an exemption for this transaction under the “grandfather” clause of the NSG guidelines. Construction of the nuclear power reactors started in November 2013. China will also supply enriched uranium to Pakistan for running those reactors. Furthermore, in February, it was reported that “China and Pakistan reached a formal agreement…to construct a third nuclear reactor at Chashma.” It is more questionable whether this agreement can be permitted as an exemption under the “grandfather” clause of the NSG guidelines.
At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, the NAM countries argued that “all States parties to the Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards,” strongly suggesting that they are critical about nuclear cooperation with the non-NPT parties, including India and Pakistan.
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
Aside from the NSG, Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).
 “The 20th Asian Export Control Seminar Was Held,” Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, February 28, 2013, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2013/0228_04.html.
 NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.2, 6 March 2013.
 South Africa implements the Catch-all Control on the material, equipment, and technology related to WMD and their delivery vehicles
 “India Strengthens Its Nuclear Export Norms,” Mint, March 13, 2013, http://www.livemint.com/Politics/HG0FHcSLTxfRp5EjbEOjbJ/India-strengthens-its-nuclear-export-norms.html.
 S/AC.44/2007/19, 3 August 2010.
 “Pakistan Confers with Export Control Groups,” Global Security Newswire, February 21, 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistan-mulls-joining-missile-export-group/.
 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, March 19, 2013, pp.24-26.
 Sankei News, July 27, 2013.
 Kyodo News, November 3, 2013.
 NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.2, 6 March 2013.
 “Statement by Japan,” Cluster 2, the Second Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference, 26 April 2013.
 NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.7, 6 March 2013.
 “North Korean Account Closed by Bank of China,” China.org.cn, May 8, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/business/2013-05/08/content_28757468.htm.
 The list published by China is posted on homepage of the Nautilus Institute, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/technical-bulletin-translatable-version/#axzz2lBo5lNZx.
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 “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010),” S/2013.331, 5 June 2013; “Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),” S/2013/337, 11 June 2013.
 “North Korea ‘Tried to Send Gas Masks to Assad,’” Japan Times, August 27, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/08/27/asia-pacific/north-korea-tried-to-send-gas-masks-to-assad/#.UortwtKkGSo.
 “Panama Uncovers Fighter Jet Engines from Seized North Korea Ship,” Reuters, July 30, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-panama-ship-idUSBRE96U02R20130731.
 Joby Warrick, “Iran’s Bid to Buy Banned Magnets Stokes Fears about Major Expansion of Nuclear Capacity,” Washington Post, February 14, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iranian-buying-spree-raises-concerns-about-major-expansion-of-nuclear-capacity/2013/02/13/2090805c-7537-11e2-8f84-3e4b513b1a13_story.html.
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 “India, Australia Inching Towards Civil Nuclear Agreement,” The Hindu, November 2, 2013, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-australia-inching-towards-civil-nuclear-agreement/article5306545.ece.
 Rachel Oswald, “Australian Election Seen Likely to Speed Talks with India on Uranium Deal,” Global Security Newswire, September 11, 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/australian-election-seen-likely-speed-talks-india-uranium-deal/.
 Fredrik Dahl, “Britain Lobbies for Nuclear Export Group to Admit India,” Reuters, June 14, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/us-nuclear-india-britain-idUSBRE95D0ZA20130614; Daniel Horner, “NSG Revises List, Continues India Debate,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 43, No. 6 (July/August 2013), pp. 38-39.
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 Bill Gertz, “China, Pakistan Reach Nuke Agreement,” The Washington Free Beacon, March 22, 2013, http://freebeacon.com/china-pakistan-reach-nuke-agreement/.
 NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, 21 March 2013.