The Hiroshima Report 2014 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
--Exective Summary (in Japanese and English)
The Hiroshima Report 2012 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)

December 27, 2013

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(2) Commitment to Achieve a World without Nuclear Weapons (sections C)

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

C) Announcement of significant policies and important activities

Obama’s Berlin Speech

The U.S. President Barack H. Obama addressed his second-term foreign and security policies, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin on June 19, 2013. With reaffirming that “[p]eace with justice means pursuing the security of a world without nuclear weapons -- no matter how distant that dream may be,” he announced:
“After a comprehensive review, I’ve determined that we can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third. And I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures. At the same time, we’ll work with our NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical weapons in Europe.”[1]

December 26, 2013

[Op-Ed] Daryl G. Kimball, "The Humanitarian Obligation to Achieve Nuclear Disarmament"

Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons have driven global leaders to pursue concrete steps to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons use. Yet the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by the worlds nine nuclear-armed statesin response to conventional attack, in response to a nuclear attack, or as the result of accidental exchangeremains. As global leaders and the public consider how to reduce the nuclear threat, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons underscore why they need to act with greater urgency.

Over time, our understanding of the scope of these effects has become more sophisticated.  Early studies found that the direct effects of a large-scale nuclear exchange would produce catastrophic regional and national damage that would kill tens of millions and likely several hundred million people within one month of the initial exchange.[1]

More comprehensive studies in mid-1980s found that the direct effects of such a nuclear large-scale nuclear war involving thousands of nuclear detonations could result in several hundred million human fatalities, the indirect effects could be far greater, leading to the loss of one to four billion lives.[2]

December 25, 2013

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(2) Commitment to Achieve a World without Nuclear Weapons (introduction, sections A and B)

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

In 2013, no new, remarkable commitment toward a “total elimination of nuclear weapons” or a “world without nuclear weapons” was set out by NWS, NNWS or nuclear-armed states. As mentioned in the Hiroshima Report 2012, no country, including the NWS, openly opposes the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons or the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.[1] The Chairman’s Factual Summary of the 2013 NPT PrepCom also noted that the NPT parties “recalled their resolve…to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty.”[2] However, it does not seem that nuclear-weapon/armed states actually set a goal of an early achievement of a world without nuclear weapons, or even consider their total elimination as a feasible, realistic goal. They have kept their position that their nuclear weapons continue to play important roles for their security policies at least in the foreseeable future. Deeper nuclear cuts in the short-run cannot be expected.

December 20, 2013

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(1) Status of Nuclear Forces (estimates)

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

Back to the Contents

As of December 2013, eight countries have declared that they have nuclear weapons. According to Article IX-3 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.” China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States meet this requirement, and have acceded to the NPT as nuclear-weapon States (NWS) which are permitted to possess nuclear weapons under the treaty.

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] Contents

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

Countries surveyed
  • Nuclear-weapon states under the NPT: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States)
  • Non-state parties to the NPT: India, Israel and Pakistan
  • Non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT:  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, UAE
  • Other: North Korea

(Link will be attached when draft is available)
1. Nuclear Disarmament 
(2) Commitment to Achieve a World without Nuclear Weapons
        - Obama’s Berlin Speech
        - Open-Ended Working Group
        - High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament
        - Oslo Conference
        - Joint Statement at the NPT PrepCom
        - Joint Statement at the First Committee
        - Response from Nuclear-Weapon States
   A) Reduction of nuclear weapons
   B) A concrete plan for further reduction of nuclear weapons
   C) Trends on strengthening/modernizing nuclear weapons capabilities
   A) Current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons in national security strategies and policies, as well as military alliance
   B) Commitment to the “sole purpose,” no first use, and related doctrines
   C) Negative security assurances
   D) Signing and ratifying the protocols of the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones
   E) Relying on extended nuclear deterrence
(6) CTBT
   A) Signing and ratifying the CTBT
   B) Moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending CTBT's entry into force
   C) Cooperation with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission
   D) Contribution to the development of the CTBT verification systems
   E) Nuclear testing
(7) FMCT
(8) Transparency in nuclear forces, fissile material for nuclear weapons, and nuclear strategy/doctrine
(9) Verification of nuclear weapons reductions
   A) Implementing or planning dismantlement of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles
   B) Decommissioning/conversion of nuclear weapons-related facilities
   C) Measures for the fissile material declared excess for military purposes, such as disposition or conversion to peaceful purposes
(11) Disarmament and non-proliferation education and cooperation with civil society

2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
   A) Accession to the NPT
   B) Compliance with Article 1 and 2 of the NPT and the UNSC Resolutions on Non-Proliferation
   C) Establishment of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
   A) Signing and Ratifying a Safeguards Agreement
   B) Compliance with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement
   A) Establishment and implementation of the national implementation system
   B) Requiring the Conclusion of the Additional Protocol for Nuclear Export
   C) Implementation of the UNSCR on North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues
   D) Participation in the PSI
   E) Civil nuclear cooperation with non-parties to the NPT

3. Nuclear Security 

December 12, 2013

[Op-Ed] Harald Müller, "Stability of the NPT Hinges on Justice"

The Hiroshima Report undertakes the important effort to work out a balance of compliance by different groups of parties with their undertakings of the NPT as specified by Review Conferences. While it does not aspire to presenting a strictly comparable record for the NPT’s “pillars” and for the compliance of different groups of parties, it offers an opportunity to readers to draw such a balance for themselves. In addition, it presumes that “balancing” matters. And this is the important point.

A convincing balance means, eventually, that the weighing between the three pillars is satisfactory to the parties, and that the compliance balance between the parties arrives at scores that parties themselves feel are appropriate, because the balance is fair. Recurring on fairness as a standard for judging politics in the security sector may strike readers as odd, at first glance. However, this consideration is in line with a key finding of half a dozen academic disciplines over the last twenty years, including some hard sciences: brain research, evolutionary biology, anthropology, social and child psychology, sociology and experimental economics, all of which converge on one finding:

Justice matters in human affairs!
Mainstream economists, International Relations "realists", and friends of "Realpoltiik" believe that international politics is all about maximizing utility (wealth, power etc.). They are wrong. Justice concerns awake emotions: Fulfillment of our claims for justice makes us happy; denial makes us angry and aggressive. For that reason, justice concerns can foster security cooperation (if the rules and norms of cooperation are seen by parties as fair and just) and can impede or even destroy it (when they are seen by parties as unjust and unfair).

December 9, 2013

[Op-Ed] Fan Jishe, "China's Nuclear Policy: An Evaluation"

Even the international security environment has undergone dramatic changes since China detonated its first nuclear device about four decades ago, China's nuclear policy remains largely unchanged ever since. When evaluating the five Nuclear Weapon States' nuclear policy, scholars and commentators have quite different views. Some pay much more attention to the opaqueness of China's nuclear posture, while others argue the merits of China's transparency in strategic intention, and China's restraint in nuclear development.

In recent years, there are rising concerns of China's nuclear policy, especially after President Obama's Prague Speech, and the Global Zero Campaign. Many scholars, commentators, even government officials complained China's indifferent attitude toward these movements, and they expected China could take some actions either to echo President Obama's Prague Speech, or to endorse the Global Zero Campaign. China's lack of action is only part of the story. With the development of China's military capability, some begin to worry that China might build up its nuclear arsenal, even sprint to parity (matching the United States and Russia's nuclear capability in numerical sense), while the United States and Russia try to build down; others suspect that China might change its No First Use policy. Generally speaking, nuclear transparency remains the key concern for China observers, especially the information related to nuclear numbers and nuclear modernization programs.

December 6, 2013

[Op-Ed] Rajiv Nayan, "The Hiroshima Report and Security without Nuclear Weapons"

The Hiroshima Report-Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: 2012-2012 is a laudable narrative of the global nuclear status and international security. The Report published by Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, has two principal parts: one details the facts on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security initiatives and the second, an evaluation of 19 countries on 11 criteria in 6 categories or ‘aspects’ of the nuclear issues. The factual account is intended to justify the evaluation or the points assigned to each country.

Although the Report does not explicitly advocate nuclear disarmament or non-proliferation, yet the tone and tenor of the Report clearly indicates that underlying objective of the Report is to see a world without nuclear weapons, and till such a goal is realized to attain a secure and stable world through nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Even if the objective is implicit, it is an admirable and worth doing so. However, the Report needs to do more work in terms of compiling objective data in the first part and assigning points to different criteria in the second to have objectivity.

What is the biggest hurdle of global nuclear disarmament? The answer to it is simple and straightforward: the lack of credible movement towards nuclear disarmament by the countries which are possessing more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenals. However, in the evaluation criteria, a country possessing 1001-2000 nuclear weapons may score minus 14 points, a country possessing 6001-8000 nuclear weapons may score minus 19 and a country possessing more than 8000 minus 20 points.

December 2, 2013

[Op-Ed] Charles D. Ferguson, "Implications of the Recent Deal with Iran on Getting Controls on Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycles"

The Hiroshima Report is a tour de force in its comprehensiveness and clarity in examining the status of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and nuclear security.  I commend the excellent work of the report’s authors and staff.

In my comments, I would like to focus on one of the biggest international challenges to nonproliferation: how states can walk up to the line of crossing into nuclear weapons capability by developing uranium enrichment plants or reprocessing plants. Both of these technologies are dual-use in that the same enrichment plant can be used to make low-enriched uranium useful for fueling peaceful nuclear reactors or to further enrich to high enough concentrations of the fissile isotope uranium-235 useful for powering nuclear weapons. Similarly, reprocessing plants can be used to separate plutonium and other fissionable materials for recycling into new fuel for reactors or for manufacturing those materials into nuclear weapons.

Very few non-nuclear weapon states have one or both of these technologies. Those non-nuclear weapon states that are presently active in enrichment are Brazil, Germany, Iran, Japan, and the Netherlands, and in reprocessing, only Japan has an active commercial reprocessing plant and does not have nuclear arms. Thus, the one non-nuclear weapon country that has both enrichment and reprocessing is Japan.

November 7, 2013

[Op-Ed] James M. Acton, "Two Nuclear Dilemmas for Japan"

Japan is where the nuclear age began on August 6, 1945.  And, for the last 68 years, the Japanese people have been at the forefront of efforts to bring this perilous era to an end.  The Hiroshima Report continues this tradition by usefully highlighting where progress toward a more secure and more just nuclear future has been made—and where it hasn't.

Rightly, the Hiroshima Report scores Japan highly on disarmament (where Japan ranks first among the ten non-nuclear weapon states surveyed) and non-proliferation (where Japan ranks equal second among the same group). That said, it must also be acknowledged that most of Japan’s points were earned for activities that did not come at the expense of conflicting policy goals. For example, Japan’s voting record in the United Nations General Assembly and its adoption of tougher IAEA safeguards, while laudable, did not carry any particular political cost (even if enhanced safeguards do come with a significant financial cost).

In the near future—possibly within the next twelve months—Japan will face two genuinely tough choices: whether to commission the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and whether to sell nuclear reactor components to India. These decisions are highly consequential for the future of the nuclear order. But, doing the right thing will incur a high political cost because it will mean sacrificing competing objectives.

November 1, 2013

[Op-Ed] Mark Fitzpatrick, "North Korea, the Nuclear Outlier"

The Hiroshima Report is to be commended for its thorough analysis of the measures that key countries have taken in fulfillment of obligations in the areas of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and security. While acknowledging the limits of a mathematical approach, they back each number with solid evidence. The report is analytically sound and politically fair. Readers can easily draw their own conclusions. 

One obvious conclusion is that one nation stands alone as a dishonorable outlier, in last place in every field. There is good reason North Korea falls under its own separate category in the report. It is the only state to have withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the only state to have signed the treaty with the intention of violating it to develop nuclear weapons. Kim Il Sung showed interest in nuclear weapons since the early 1960s. 

North Korea also violated the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States and the 1991 North-South Denuclearization Agreement, under which the two Koreas agreed to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing. More recently, North Korea violated the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and the 2012 Leap Day deal with the United States.

October 29, 2013

[Op-Ed] Bruno Tertrais, "Comments on Hiroshima Report of March 2013"

The “Hiroshima Report” is an extremely valuable addition to the already existing literature on evaluations and scorecards regarding policies towards nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and security. Its originality resides in its comprehensive and detailed nature.

Below are a few remarks designed to help with the understanding and promotion with the report, as well as future updates.

On the general approach of nuclear security, the report assumes that “the more nuclear weapons or fissile material usable for nuclear weapons a country possesses, the greater the task of reducing them and ensuring their security” (p. 4). This is undeniably true for nuclear reductions, but perhaps less so regarding nuclear security. The degree of difficulty for maintaining a high degree of nuclear security may depend more on the number (and type of) storage sites than on the quantity of weapons and materials. 

July 30, 2013

Research Design: Items -- Excerpt from the Hiroshima Report 2012

Items for study, analysis and evaluation of the selected countries’ performance are built mainly upon the following documents that reflect views with wide support on the issues of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security. Items are also chosen with the aim of providing a certain degree of objective measurements for evaluation.
Ø  The Action Plan and recommendations pertaining to the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution contained in the Final Document adopted in the 2010 NPT Review Conference;
Ø  Seventy-six recommendations contained in the 2009 International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) report titled “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers”;
Ø  Proposals sponsored or co-sponsored by Japan at the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom); and
Ø  “Resolution towards the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons” launched by the Mayors for Peace in 2011.

July 29, 2013

Research Design: Approach -- Excerpt from the Hiroshima Report 2012

This project focuses on the time period from the conclusion of the 2010 NPT RevCon until the end of 2012. Reference documents are basically open sources, such as speeches, remarks, and working papers delivered at disarmament fora (e.g., NPT Preparatory Committee, UN General Assembly, and Conference on Disarmament) and official documents published by governments and international organizations.

As for the evaluation section, a set of objective evaluation criteria is established by which the respective country’s performance is assessed.

July 26, 2013

Purpose of the Project: Excerpts from the Hiroshima Report 2012

"The momentum created by U.S. President Barack Obama’s speech in Prague in April 2009 for a world without nuclear weapons seems to be weakening. The number of nuclear weapons has been reduced to around 20,000, equivalent to one-third of the peak at the height of the Cold War. However, the prospects of eliminating nuclear weapons are still distant at best. Even more worrying, the situation regarding nuclear weapons is becoming more and more complex. On the positive side, the New START, a U.S.-Russian bilateral strategic nuclear weapons reduction treaty, was signed in April 2010. In the following month, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) unanimously adopted a Final Document, which contained a specific action plan for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security, along with key recommendations related to the Middle East. After these positive movements, however, the negotiation on a post-New START bilateral nuclear reduction treaty has yet to be launched, and other nuclear weapons possessors do not even seem to have the intention to start further, if any, reduction of their arsenals. The goals of early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the immediate commencement and early conclusion of Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations have been reiterated for more than a decade without meaningful progress. Iran and North Korea seem to consolidate their respective nuclear (weapons) capabilities. Notwithstanding gradual reinforcement of nuclear security, the threat of nuclear terrorism remains a high security concern. While problems regarding nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security continue to accumulate, efforts toward solving them have progressed at a snail's pace.

July 25, 2013


The Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (CPDNP), Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) is commissioned a research project on Evaluating Performances of Selected Countries in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security by the Hiroshima Prefecture. The Result of the FY2012 project was published as the Hiroshima Report--Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: 2010-2012.

In FY2013, the CPDNP has launched this blog aiming to provoke discussions on nuclear issues and to get feedbacks for preparing Hiroshima Report 2013. In this blog, experts on nuclear issues will discuss, inter alia, the findings of the Hiroshima Report, on which issues or areas  the international community should make further efforts towards a world without nuclear weapons. The staff of this project will be posting an initial draft of Hiroshima Report 2013. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!