The Hiroshima Report--Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: 2014" was published on April 7, 2014.
The Report and summary (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
Executive Summary (in Japanese and English)
Introduction
The Hiroshima Report 2014 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
The Hiroshima Report 2012 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
April 7, 2014
March 11, 2014
[Op-Ed] Takanori Mikami, "Significance of Ranking Countries for World without Nuclear Weapons"
Since August 6, 1945, Hiroshima's mission
has been to educate the world about the cruelty and disaster caused by the use
of atomic weapons. Hiroshima has been so successful in their mission that,
after almost 70 years since the destruction, atomic weapons have never been
used during war. As Nobel laureate and economist, Thomas Schelling, pointed out
in his acceptance speech, Hiroshima's legacy has prevented atomic weapons from
being used in the world.[1]
However, the surge of terrorist attacks has
forced us to change this notion. Human beings may again suffer gigantic
destruction and its lingering consequences. Graham Allison, who analyzed the
Cuban missile crisis in his book, warned the world about the upcoming threat of
nuclear terrorism. Allison is not alone; George P. Schultz, William J. Perry,
Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn have also earnestly insisted that the world
needs to be free from nuclear weapons facing emerging challenges posed by state
and non-state actors.[2]
February 21, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 3-(3) Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Minimization of HEU in Civilian Use
HEU has been
utilized for civilian purposes through the use of research reactors and isotope
production reactors. However, since HEU is suitable for the manufacture of
nuclear explosive devices, if it is removed from a regulatory control without
authorization, such as by theft, it becomes possible that non-state actors as
well as states can produce nuclear explosive devices. Against this concern, the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was commenced in 2004 by the U.S. proposal
for the purposes of returning Russian- or U.S.-origin HEU located in civilian
sites in the world to its respective origins and converting research reactors
to use low enriched uranium (LEU). The Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and
2012 upheld this effort as one of the most important actions to be taken.
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 3-(2)Status of Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety Related Conventions, Participation to Nuclear Security Related Initiatives, and Application to Domestic Systems
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Accession Status to Nuclear Security Related
Conventions
This report surveys the accession status of
each country to the following nuclear security and safety related conventions: Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Amendment to CPPNM
(CPPNM Amendment), International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), Convention on Nuclear Safety
(Nuclear Safety Convention), Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and Convention on Assistance in the
Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The results are summarized
in Table 3-4.
February 10, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 3-(1) The Amount of Fissile Material Usable for Weapons
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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Nuclear security threat is defined as “a
person or group of persons with motivation, intention and capability to commit
criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear
material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated
activities or other acts determined by the State to have an adverse impact on
nuclear security.”[1] The IAEA recommends to take a graded approach that takes into
account: “the current evaluation of the threat, the relative ‘attractiveness’[2], the nature of the nuclear material and potential consequences
associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the
sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear facilities”[3] to decide physical protection requirements. This suggests that the
more suitable nuclear and other radioactive material, related nuclear
facilities and activities are to achieving certain malicious intentions, the
higher the nuclear security risk is, thereby requiring a high-level of
protection measures corresponding to the security risk. In a similar way, the
larger the consequences of a certain malicious act, the stronger the level of security
measures required.
February 6, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] (3) Nuclear Security: Introduction
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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In response to the increasing concern about
“loose nukes” resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the
terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2011, international efforts
to enhance nuclear security have accelerated and nuclear security tools have
been greatly reinforced (augmented). In 2005, the Amendment to the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted (has not yet entered
into force). In 2007, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) entered into force. In
2011, the fifth revision of Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5)
was issued. In addition, the two Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012
provided opportunities for world leaders to show commitment to strengthening
nuclear security by declaring and supporting nuclear security approaches to be
taken. Similarly, the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing
Global Efforts, organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
July 2013, served as a platform for participating countries to make official
remarks about their respective nuclear security policies at the Ministerial
Meeting at the beginning of the conference. These official statements, as well
as the membership status of international conventions and implementation status
of the measures recommended to take by INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, provide an important
overview for assessing the nuclear security performance of each country.
January 31, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(6) Transparency in the peaceful use of nuclear energy
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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In addition to accepting the IAEA
safeguards, as described earlier, a state should aim to be fully transparent
about its nuclear-related activities and future plans, in order to demonstrate
that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. A state that concludes
an AP with the IAEA is obliged to provide information on its general plans for
the next ten-year period relevant to the development of its nuclear fuel cycle
(including nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities). Major countries actively
promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy have issued mid- or long-term
nuclear development plans, including the construction of nuclear power plants.[1]
The international community may be concerned about the possible development of
nuclear weapon programs when states conduct nuclear activities without publishing
their nuclear development plans (e.g. Israel, North Korea, and Syria), or are
engaged in nuclear activities which seem inconsistent with their
plans, capabilities and technologies (e.g. Iran).
January 30, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(5) Implementing appropriate export controls on nuclear-related items and technologies
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Establishment and implementation of the
national implementation system
Japan serves as a member of all
international export control regimes,[1]
including the NSG, and it has established the relevant national implementation systems
(legislative measures and implementation systems). Japan implements an advanced
export control system enforcing two types of controls: Catch-all Control and List
Control. Under the Japanese export control system, all countries are subject to
the WMD Catch-all Control, except for countries belonging to the four
international export control regimes and having solid export controls in place,
including WMD Catch-all Controls. Japan calls these countries the “white
countries.” Currently, Japan designates 26 white countries. Regarding states
surveyed in this project, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States are “white countries.” Like Japan, these
countries also have their national implementation systems in place and have implemented
effective export controls regarding nuclear-related items and technologies.
January 28, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(4) Cooperation with the IAEA
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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One of the most important measures to
strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system is to promote the
universal application of the Additional Protocol. Among the countries surveyed
in this project, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States consider that the AP is “an
integral part” of the current IAEA safeguards system.[1]
Although it adopts a more moderate position, China also is of the opinion that “[i]t is necessary to strengthen the
safeguards function of the IAEA and promote the universality of the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol.”[2] At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, Switzerland,
which is interested in optimizing the IAEA safeguards system, issued a working
paper on strengthening cooperation between the IAEA and states.[3] Countries like Brazil, Russia and South Africa consider that the conclusion
of an AP should be voluntary, not obligatory, although they acknowledge the importance
of the AP with regard to safeguards, as a major component of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime. The NAM countries also argue that “it is fundamental
to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary
confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be
turned into legal safeguards obligations.”[4]
January 27, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(3) IAEA safeguards Applied to NWS and non-parties to the NPT
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
A NWS is not required to conclude the CSA
with the IAEA. However, to alleviate the concerns about the discriminatory
nature of the NPT, the NWS have voluntarily agreed to apply safeguards to some
of their nuclear facilities and fissile material that are not involved in
military activities. All NWS have also concluded an AP with the IAEA.
January 24, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(2) IAEA Safeguards Applied to the NPT NNWS
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Conclusion of the IAEA Safeguards Agreements
Under Article III-1 of the NPT, “[e]ach Non-nuclear-weapon
State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards as set forth in an
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification
of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.” The basic structure and content of the
safeguards agreement are specified in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
(CSA). To date, 12 NPT NNWS have yet to conclude CSAs with the IAEA.[1]
An NPT NNWS or any other state may also conclude a protocol additional to its
safeguards agreement, or the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP). As of September 2013,
116 NPT NNWS have ratified the APs. New ratifying countries in 2013 were Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Vietnam.
January 23, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(1) Acceptance and compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation obligations
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Accession to the NPT
Among the current 194 UN Member
States, those remaining outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are: India
and Pakistan, both of which tested and declared having nuclear weapons in 1998;
Israel, which is widely believed to possess them; and South Sudan, which
declared its independence and joined the United Nations in July 2011, and does
not have any nuclear weapons. North Korea declared its withdrawal from the
NPT twice, in 1993 and 2003, and has refused to return to the Treaty despite
the UN Security Council resolutions demanding that it do so at an
early date.
January 22, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(12) Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
On August 6, 2013, the Hiroshima Peace
Memorial Ceremony was held in Hiroshima. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and
Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida attended the Ceremony, along with representatives
from 70 countries and the EU, including:
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(11) Disarmament and non-proliferation education and cooperation with civil society
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
As surveyed in
the Hiroshima Report 2012, most countries have not made
available information on their activities undertaken with respect to
disarmament and non-proliferation education, including
cooperation with civil society, or the outcome of these efforts. During the 67th
session of the UN General Assembly in July 2012, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
issued a report stating that only nine countries, including Austria, Japan,
Mexico and New Zealand, had informed the UN on their implementation of his
recommendations.[1]
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(10) Irreversibility
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Implementing or planning dismantlement
of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles
Just like their previous nuclear arms
control agreements, the New START requires Russia and the United States to dismantle
or convert strategic (nuclear) delivery vehicles beyond the limits set in the
Treaty, in a verifiable way. The New START does not
oblige them to dismantle nuclear warheads, but the two states have partially
dismantled retired nuclear warheads as unilateral measures.
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(9) Verifications of Nuclear Weapons Reductions
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
In the Hiroshima Report 2012, the following
issues were surveyed: acceptance and implementation of verification for nuclear
weapons reduction; engagement in research and development of verification
measures of nuclear weapons reduction; and acceptance of the IAEA verification
to fissile material declared as no longer required for military purposes. In
2013, no significant progress was seen on these issues. Russia and the United
States have implemented verifications under the New START. Both countries have
also discussed verification measures for their fissile material surplus to the
defense program with the IAEA, but have not concluded.[1]
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
[1] Tom Clements, Edwin Lyman and Frank von Hippel, “The Future of
Plutonium Disposition,” Arms Control
Today, Vol. 43, No. 6 (July/August 2013), p. 11.
January 17, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(8) Transparency in nuclear forces, fissile material for nuclear weapons, and nuclear strategy/doctrine
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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In the Final Document of the 2010 NPT
RevCon, the NWS were called upon to report on actions taken towards
“accelerat[ion of] concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear
disarmament” to the 2014 PrepCom (Action 5). However, it is pointed out that
“[t]he prospect of achieving concrete progress against the Action Plan before
the 2014 reporting deadline is low.”[1]
On the other hand, at the fourth P5 Conference held in April 2013, the five NWS
“reaffirmed their objective to submit a P5 glossary [of definitions] of key
nuclear terms to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.”[2]
China reported at the 2013 NPT PrepCom that their “experts have reached a preliminary agreement on a
list of key nuclear terms.” China also indicated the prospect that the “[w]ork
on the compilation and translation of the Glossary is scheduled to be concluded
in [the]
next 2 years, [and its]
outcome [would] be reported to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.”[3]
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(6) CTBT
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Signing and ratifying the CTBT
As of November 2013, 161 countries among
183 signatories have deposited their instruments of ratification of the CTBT. Among
the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, whose ratification is a
prerequisite for the treaty’s entry into force, five states (China, Egypt, Iran,
Israel and the United States) have signed but not ratified, and three (India,
North Korea and Pakistan) have not even signed. Syria, among the countries
surveyed, has also not signed the CTBT. U.S. President Obama again pledged to
make efforts for ratifying the treaty in his Berlin speech, but the Obama
administration has yet to submit it to the Senate for ratification. No
significant progress or remarkable movement by other non-signatories/ratifiers
surveyed in this Report was found in 2013, either.
January 16, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(7) Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
In the 2013 session of the Conference on
Disarmament (CD), its program of work, including the establishment of an Ad Hoc
Committee on an FMCT negotiation, could not be adopted again, due to Pakistan’s
strong objection, as was the case in the previous years. Pakistan continues to
insist that the mandate of the FMCT negotiation must not only prohibit the
fissile material production for nuclear weapons but also cover the existing
stockpiles, and that it could not accept the adoption of the program of work in
which the issues on existing stockpile were not included.
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(5) De-alerting or measures for maximizing decision time to authorize the use of nuclear weapons
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
According to one U.S. expert, about 1,800
nuclear weapons possessed by Russia and the United States are considered to be
on high alert status, either Launch On Warning (LOW) or Launch Under Attack (LUA). 48 U.K. nuclear warheads and 80
French ones are also kept on alert under their continuous SSBN patrols, albeit at
lower readiness levels than those of the two nuclear superpowers.[1]
January 9, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(2) Commitment to Achieve a World without Nuclear Weapons (sections D)
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
D) Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons
Since the joint statement delivered by 16 countries at the NPT PrepCom in 2012, debates on humanitarian
consequences of nuclear weapons have received remarkable attention from the
international community.
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(4) Diminishing the Role and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in the National Security Strategies and Policies
(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
The Hiroshima Report 2012 attempted to
analyze the role and significance of nuclear weapons in the national security
strategies and policies, mainly based on the declaratory policies of the
nuclear-weapon/armed states. In 2013, there have been few significant changes
in their nuclear policies.
January 6, 2014
[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(3) Reduction of Nuclear Weapons
Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!
A) Reduction of nuclear weapons
Russia and the United States continue to
undertake reductions of their strategic nuclear weapons under the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The status of their strategic (nuclear) delivery
vehicles and warheads under the Treaty has been periodically updated in the
U.S. State Department homepage (see table 1-2 below).
Russia and the United States continue to
undertake reductions of their strategic nuclear weapons under the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The status of their strategic (nuclear) delivery
vehicles and warheads under the Treaty has been periodically updated in the
U.S. State Department homepage (see table 1-2 below).
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