Introduction

The Hiroshima Report 2014 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
--Exective Summary (in Japanese and English)
The Hiroshima Report 2012 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)

April 7, 2014

Hiroshima Report 2014

The Hiroshima Report--Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: 2014" was published on April 7, 2014. 
The Report and summary (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:

Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
Executive Summary (in Japanese and English)

March 11, 2014

[Op-Ed] Takanori Mikami, "Significance of Ranking Countries for World without Nuclear Weapons"

Since August 6, 1945, Hiroshima's mission has been to educate the world about the cruelty and disaster caused by the use of atomic weapons. Hiroshima has been so successful in their mission that, after almost 70 years since the destruction, atomic weapons have never been used during war. As Nobel laureate and economist, Thomas Schelling, pointed out in his acceptance speech, Hiroshima's legacy has prevented atomic weapons from being used in the world.[1]

However, the surge of terrorist attacks has forced us to change this notion. Human beings may again suffer gigantic destruction and its lingering consequences. Graham Allison, who analyzed the Cuban missile crisis in his book, warned the world about the upcoming threat of nuclear terrorism. Allison is not alone; George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn have also earnestly insisted that the world needs to be free from nuclear weapons facing emerging challenges posed by state and non-state actors.[2]

February 21, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 3-(3) Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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A) Minimization of HEU in Civilian Use

HEU has been utilized for civilian purposes through the use of research reactors and isotope production reactors. However, since HEU is suitable for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, if it is removed from a regulatory control without authorization, such as by theft, it becomes possible that non-state actors as well as states can produce nuclear explosive devices. Against this concern, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was commenced in 2004 by the U.S. proposal for the purposes of returning Russian- or U.S.-origin HEU located in civilian sites in the world to its respective origins and converting research reactors to use low enriched uranium (LEU). The Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 upheld this effort as one of the most important actions to be taken.

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 3-(2)Status of Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety Related Conventions, Participation to Nuclear Security Related Initiatives, and Application to Domestic Systems

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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A) Accession Status to Nuclear Security Related Conventions

This report surveys the accession status of each country to the following nuclear security and safety related conventions: Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Amendment to CPPNM (CPPNM Amendment), International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention), Convention on Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention), Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The results are summarized in Table 3-4.

February 10, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 3-(1) The Amount of Fissile Material Usable for Weapons

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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Nuclear security threat is defined as “a person or group of persons with motivation, intention and capability to commit criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities or other acts determined by the State to have an adverse impact on nuclear security.”[1] The IAEA recommends to take a graded approach that takes into account: “the current evaluation of the threat, the relative ‘attractiveness’[2], the nature of the nuclear material and potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material or nuclear facilities”[3] to decide physical protection requirements. This suggests that the more suitable nuclear and other radioactive material, related nuclear facilities and activities are to achieving certain malicious intentions, the higher the nuclear security risk is, thereby requiring a high-level of protection measures corresponding to the security risk. In a similar way, the larger the consequences of a certain malicious act, the stronger the level of security measures required. 

February 6, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] (3) Nuclear Security: Introduction

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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In response to the increasing concern about “loose nukes” resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2011, international efforts to enhance nuclear security have accelerated and nuclear security tools have been greatly reinforced (augmented). In 2005, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted (has not yet entered into force). In 2007, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) entered into force. In 2011, the fifth revision of Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) was issued. In addition, the two Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 provided opportunities for world leaders to show commitment to strengthening nuclear security by declaring and supporting nuclear security approaches to be taken. Similarly, the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in July 2013, served as a platform for participating countries to make official remarks about their respective nuclear security policies at the Ministerial Meeting at the beginning of the conference. These official statements, as well as the membership status of international conventions and implementation status of the measures recommended to take by INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, provide an important overview for assessing the nuclear security performance of each country.   

January 31, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(6) Transparency in the peaceful use of nuclear energy

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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In addition to accepting the IAEA safeguards, as described earlier, a state should aim to be fully transparent about its nuclear-related activities and future plans, in order to demonstrate that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. A state that concludes an AP with the IAEA is obliged to provide information on its general plans for the next ten-year period relevant to the development of its nuclear fuel cycle (including nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities). Major countries actively promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy have issued mid- or long-term nuclear development plans, including the construction of nuclear power plants.[1] The international community may be concerned about the possible development of nuclear weapon programs when states conduct nuclear activities without publishing their nuclear development plans (e.g. Israel, North Korea, and Syria), or are engaged in nuclear activities which seem inconsistent with their plans, capabilities and technologies (e.g. Iran).

January 30, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(5) Implementing appropriate export controls on nuclear-related items and technologies

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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A) Establishment and implementation of the national implementation system

Japan serves as a member of all international export control regimes,[1] including the NSG, and it has established the relevant national implementation systems (legislative measures and implementation systems). Japan implements an advanced export control system enforcing two types of controls: Catch-all Control and List Control. Under the Japanese export control system, all countries are subject to the WMD Catch-all Control, except for countries belonging to the four international export control regimes and having solid export controls in place, including WMD Catch-all Controls. Japan calls these countries the “white countries.” Currently, Japan designates 26 white countries. Regarding states surveyed in this project, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States are “white countries.” Like Japan, these countries also have their national implementation systems in place and have implemented effective export controls regarding nuclear-related items and technologies.

January 28, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(4) Cooperation with the IAEA

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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One of the most important measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system is to promote the universal application of the Additional Protocol. Among the countries surveyed in this project, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States consider that the AP is “an integral part” of the current IAEA safeguards system.[1] Although it adopts a more moderate position, China also is of the opinion that “[i]t is necessary to strengthen the safeguards function of the IAEA and promote the universality of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol.”[2] At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, Switzerland, which is interested in optimizing the IAEA safeguards system, issued a working paper on strengthening cooperation between the IAEA and states.[3] Countries like Brazil, Russia and South Africa consider that the conclusion of an AP should be voluntary, not obligatory, although they acknowledge the importance of the AP with regard to safeguards, as a major component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NAM countries also argue that “it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations.”[4]

January 27, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(3) IAEA safeguards Applied to NWS and non-parties to the NPT

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
A NWS is not required to conclude the CSA with the IAEA. However, to alleviate the concerns about the discriminatory nature of the NPT, the NWS have voluntarily agreed to apply safeguards to some of their nuclear facilities and fissile material that are not involved in military activities. All NWS have also concluded an AP with the IAEA.

January 24, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(2) IAEA Safeguards Applied to the NPT NNWS

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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A) Conclusion of the IAEA Safeguards Agreements

Under Article III-1 of the NPT, “[e]ach Non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” The basic structure and content of the safeguards agreement are specified in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). To date, 12 NPT NNWS have yet to conclude CSAs with the IAEA.[1] An NPT NNWS or any other state may also conclude a protocol additional to its safeguards agreement, or the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP). As of September 2013, 116 NPT NNWS have ratified the APs. New ratifying countries in 2013 were Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Vietnam.

January 23, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(1) Acceptance and compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation obligations

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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A) Accession to the NPT

Among the current 194 UN Member States, those remaining outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are: India and Pakistan, both of which tested and declared having nuclear weapons in 1998; Israel, which is widely believed to possess them; and South Sudan, which declared its independence and joined the United Nations in July 2011, and does not have any nuclear weapons. North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT twice, in 1993 and 2003, and has refused to return to the Treaty despite the UN Security Council resolutions demanding that it do so at an early date.

January 22, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(12) Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

On August 6, 2013, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony was held in Hiroshima. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida attended the Ceremony, along with representatives from 70 countries and the EU, including:

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(11) Disarmament and non-proliferation education and cooperation with civil society

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

As surveyed in the Hiroshima Report 2012, most countries have not made available information on their activities undertaken with respect to disarmament and non-proliferation education, including cooperation with civil society, or the outcome of these efforts. During the 67th session of the UN General Assembly in July 2012, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report stating that only nine countries, including Austria, Japan, Mexico and New Zealand, had informed the UN on their implementation of his recommendations.[1]

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(10) Irreversibility

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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A) Implementing or planning dismantlement of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles

Just like their previous nuclear arms control agreements, the New START requires Russia and the United States to dismantle or convert strategic (nuclear) delivery vehicles beyond the limits set in the Treaty, in a verifiable way. The New START does not oblige them to dismantle nuclear warheads, but the two states have partially dismantled retired nuclear warheads as unilateral measures.

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(9) Verifications of Nuclear Weapons Reductions

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
In the Hiroshima Report 2012, the following issues were surveyed: acceptance and implementation of verification for nuclear weapons reduction; engagement in research and development of verification measures of nuclear weapons reduction; and acceptance of the IAEA verification to fissile material declared as no longer required for military purposes. In 2013, no significant progress was seen on these issues. Russia and the United States have implemented verifications under the New START. Both countries have also discussed verification measures for their fissile material surplus to the defense program with the IAEA, but have not concluded.[1]


(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)



[1] Tom Clements, Edwin Lyman and Frank von Hippel, “The Future of Plutonium Disposition,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 43, No. 6 (July/August 2013), p. 11.

January 17, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(8) Transparency in nuclear forces, fissile material for nuclear weapons, and nuclear strategy/doctrine

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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In the Final Document of the 2010 NPT RevCon, the NWS were called upon to report on actions taken towards “accelerat[ion of] concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament” to the 2014 PrepCom (Action 5). However, it is pointed out that “[t]he prospect of achieving concrete progress against the Action Plan before the 2014 reporting deadline is low.”[1] On the other hand, at the fourth P5 Conference held in April 2013, the five NWS “reaffirmed their objective to submit a P5 glossary [of definitions] of key nuclear terms to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.”[2] China reported at the 2013 NPT PrepCom that their “experts have reached a preliminary agreement on a list of key nuclear terms.” China also indicated the prospect that the “[w]ork on the compilation and translation of the Glossary is scheduled to be concluded in [the] next 2 years, [and its] outcome [would] be reported to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.”[3]

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(6) CTBT

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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A) Signing and ratifying the CTBT

As of November 2013, 161 countries among 183 signatories have deposited their instruments of ratification of the CTBT. Among the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the treaty’s entry into force, five states (China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States) have signed but not ratified, and three (India, North Korea and Pakistan) have not even signed. Syria, among the countries surveyed, has also not signed the CTBT. U.S. President Obama again pledged to make efforts for ratifying the treaty in his Berlin speech, but the Obama administration has yet to submit it to the Senate for ratification. No significant progress or remarkable movement by other non-signatories/ratifiers surveyed in this Report was found in 2013, either.

January 16, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(7) Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
In the 2013 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), its program of work, including the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on an FMCT negotiation, could not be adopted again, due to Pakistan’s strong objection, as was the case in the previous years. Pakistan continues to insist that the mandate of the FMCT negotiation must not only prohibit the fissile material production for nuclear weapons but also cover the existing stockpiles, and that it could not accept the adoption of the program of work in which the issues on existing stockpile were not included.

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(5) De-alerting or measures for maximizing decision time to authorize the use of nuclear weapons

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
According to one U.S. expert, about 1,800 nuclear weapons possessed by Russia and the United States are considered to be on high alert status, either Launch On Warning (LOW) or Launch Under Attack (LUA). 48 U.K. nuclear warheads and 80 French ones are also kept on alert under their continuous SSBN patrols, albeit at lower readiness levels than those of the two nuclear superpowers.[1]

January 9, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(2) Commitment to Achieve a World without Nuclear Weapons (sections D)

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

D) Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons

Since the joint statement delivered by 16 countries at the NPT PrepCom in 2012, debates on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have received remarkable attention from the international community.

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(4) Diminishing the Role and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in the National Security Strategies and Policies

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

The Hiroshima Report 2012 attempted to analyze the role and significance of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies and policies, mainly based on the declaratory policies of the nuclear-weapon/armed states. In 2013, there have been few significant changes in their nuclear policies.

January 6, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(3) Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

A) Reduction of nuclear weapons

Russia and the United States continue to undertake reductions of their strategic nuclear weapons under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The status of their strategic (nuclear) delivery vehicles and warheads under the Treaty has been periodically updated in the U.S. State Department homepage (see table 1-2 below).