(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
In the 2013 session of the Conference on
Disarmament (CD), its program of work, including the establishment of an Ad Hoc
Committee on an FMCT negotiation, could not be adopted again, due to Pakistan’s
strong objection, as was the case in the previous years. Pakistan continues to
insist that the mandate of the FMCT negotiation must not only prohibit the
fissile material production for nuclear weapons but also cover the existing
stockpiles, and that it could not accept the adoption of the program of work in
which the issues on existing stockpile were not included.
In January, CD President András Dékány (Hungarian Ambassador to the CD) proposed an unofficial draft of a program of work, proposing to “establish a working group…entitled ‘Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament,’ to consider proposals to take forward nuclear disarmament negotiations with the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons by progressive and systematic efforts, and, as a first step thereof, to begin substantive work towards a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.”[1] He presented a draft program of work as CD/1948 on February 11, but Pakistan reiterated its arguments on a FMCT and blocked its adoption. After that, two drafts of a program of work—CD/1952 of June 21 and CD/1995 of August 13—were presented but could not be adopted due to the failure to achieve a consensus among the CD member states.
In January, CD President András Dékány (Hungarian Ambassador to the CD) proposed an unofficial draft of a program of work, proposing to “establish a working group…entitled ‘Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament,’ to consider proposals to take forward nuclear disarmament negotiations with the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons by progressive and systematic efforts, and, as a first step thereof, to begin substantive work towards a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.”[1] He presented a draft program of work as CD/1948 on February 11, but Pakistan reiterated its arguments on a FMCT and blocked its adoption. After that, two drafts of a program of work—CD/1952 of June 21 and CD/1995 of August 13—were presented but could not be adopted due to the failure to achieve a consensus among the CD member states.
The UN General Assembly in 2012 adopted the
resolution to request “the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States
on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, including possible aspects thereof, and to
submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly.”[2]
In accordance with this resolution, the UN Secretary-General submitted a report
to the General Assembly, in which he summarized the main points of the views of
UN member states, including Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, South Korea, South
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, the United Kingdom and the United States.[3]
The whole text of the original report submitted by each country is also posted
on the UN homepage.[4]
According to its report, Pakistan explained its position on the FMCT
negotiations as follows:[5]
Ø “[W]hen the idea of a FMCT was introduced in the CD in 1995, our
security interests required that such a treaty should not only be ban future
production of fissile material but also address the serious asymmetry in
fissile material stockpiles of countries, especially in South Asia.”
Ø “Our concerns regarding asymmetry in stocks have been further
accentuated as a result of the discriminatory policies relating to selective “civilian
nuclear cooperation,” guided by strategic and commercial interests of some
states, which would enhance the production of fissile material for military
purposes by our neighbor. This has further worsened the asymmetry of stocks in
our region. In such circumstances, Pakistan has been compelled to oppose
negotiations for a treaty on fissile material that would permanently freeze its
disadvantage and as such fundamentally compromise its security interests by
undermining its deterrent capability.”
Ø “Therefore, from our perspective, an equitable and balanced treaty
on fissile material must negotiate not only a ban on future production but also
reduce the asymmetry in stockpiles.”
Along with Pakistan, Iran insists that the
existing stockpile of fissile material for nuclear weapons should be covered in
the scope of the FMCT. Brazil and South Africa argue that the treaty should
cover past and future production of fissile material for weapons, but propose
that concluding a treaty prohibiting future production of fissile material for
weapons should be treated as a matter of priority. China and Israel support the
commencement of negotiations on a FMCT prohibiting the future production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons, but they do so less actively than the
other NWS.
During the 2012 session of the UN General
Assembly, a resolution proposed by Canada was adopted, in which the
establishment of a group of governmental experts (GGE) on a FMCT was requested.[6]
The GGE will be convened for eight weeks during 2014-2015. At the 2013 NPT
PrepCom, Canada and Spain in their working paper summarized viewpoints regarding
the duration of the
treaty, a mechanism for its entry into force and clauses for withdrawal as
being important issues, though receiving less attention when the negotiation of
the treaty started.[7]
Among nuclear-weapon/armed states, China,
India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea have yet to declare a moratorium on the
production of fissile material for weapons use. India is
reported to be constructing a second gas centrifuge facility at the Rare
Materials Plant (RMP), near Mysore, which “could significantly increase India’s
ability to produce highly enriched uranium for military purposes.”[8]
Pakistan continues to construct a reprocessing plant, and North Korea is
considered to expand a uranium enrichment capability.
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
[1] “Draft Decision on a Programme of Work for the 2013 Session:
Submitted by the President,” Conference on Disarmament, January 29, 2013.
[2] A/RES/67/53, 4 January 2013.
[3] A/68/154, 16 July 2013.
[4] “Member States' Views,” United Nations Office at Geneva, http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/disarmament.nsf/%28httpPages%29/384E4AAF5A1D7189C1257B7C003140CA?OpenDocument&unid=B8A3B48A3FB7185EC1257B280045DBE3.
[5] “Pakistan’s View Pursuant to Resolution 67/53 Entitled: ‘Treaty Banning
the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices,’ Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 3 December 2012,” http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/82A4BC6F7AE836EEC1257B98005B4203/$file/Pakistan.pdf.
[6] A/RES/67/53, 4 January 2013.
[7] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.13/Rev.1, 24 April 2013.
[8] David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, “Construction
Finishing of Likely New Indian Centrifuge Facility at Rare Material Plant,” ISIS Imagery Brief, December 4, 2013.
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