(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Signing and ratifying the CTBT
As of November 2013, 161 countries among 183 signatories have deposited their instruments of ratification of the CTBT. Among the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the treaty’s entry into force, five states (China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States) have signed but not ratified, and three (India, North Korea and Pakistan) have not even signed. Syria, among the countries surveyed, has also not signed the CTBT. U.S. President Obama again pledged to make efforts for ratifying the treaty in his Berlin speech, but the Obama administration has yet to submit it to the Senate for ratification. No significant progress or remarkable movement by other non-signatories/ratifiers surveyed in this Report was found in 2013, either.
On September 27, the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT was convened, at which participating countries discussed the importance of early entry into force of the Treaty, and the significance of further strengthening the verification regime, including the international monitoring system (IMS). In the Final Declaration adopted at the Conference, participating countries “urge[d] all remaining States, especially those whose signatures and ratifications are necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty, to take individual initiatives to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay in order to achieve its earliest entry into force.” They also pointed out:
“[W]e appreciated the effectiveness of the CTBT verification regime demonstrated in response to the nuclear test explosion announced by [North Korea] on 12 February 2013. On this occasion, the [IMS] of this verification regime successfully detected unusual seismic waveforms and infrasound signals, providing relevant and useful physical data to States Signatories promptly. Further measurements of radioactive noble gases later in April 2013 also confirmed the sensitivity and specificity of the monitoring network.”
China, Israel and the United States stated the following regarding the issues of ratification at the Conference:
Ø China—“The Chinese government has submitted the Treaty to the National People’s Congress for its deliberation and will continue to push forward the deliberation process. I am confident that China will never become the obstacle for the Treaty’s entry-into-force.”
Ø Israel— “Israel’s stance on the CTBT’s entry into force will be based on the overall regional situation, the completion of the treaty’s verification regime, as mandated by the Treaty, and Israel’s sovereign equality status in the policy making organs of the Treaty.”
Ø The United States— “With advancements in verification and the U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program in mind, we have begun the process of engaging the American public. We know that the Treaty is not at the forefront of people’s minds these days and that it is very technical in nature. We want people to take their time and absorb and understand the rationale behind it. There are no set timeframes to bring the Treaty to a vote, and we are going to be patient, but we also will be persistent in our outreach efforts.”
On the same day of the Conference, the CTBTO launched the Group of Eminent Persons (GEM), comprising 18 eminent personalities and internationally recognized experts, for the purpose of supporting and complementing efforts to promote the CTBT’s entry into force.
As for outreach activities for promoting the Treaty’s entry into force, a document, “Activities Undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States under Measure (I) of the Final Declaration of the 2009 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty in the Period September 2011-August 2013,” distributed at the Conference, summarized activities conducted by ratifying and signatory states. It highlighted the bilateral activities related to the Annex 2 states (conducted by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Turkey, the U.K., the U.S., and others), those pertaining to the non-Annex 2 states (conducted by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Turkey, the U.K., the U.S., and others), the global-level activities (conducted by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, the U.K., the U.S., and others), and the regional-level activities (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Turkey, the U.K., the U.S., and others) .
On the effort to ban a nuclear test, a project named the ATOM (Abolish Testing. Our Mission) was established in August 2012 through the initiative of Kazakhstan, where the Semipalatinsk Test Site (closed in 1991) is located. The ATOM Project is “an international campaign designed to do more than create awareness surrounding the human and environmental devastation caused by nuclear weapons testing,” and aiming to achieve a “world without nuclear testing.” The Project held an exhibition at the Vienna International Center as a part of activities of the International Day against Nuclear Tests in August 2013.
B) The moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending CTBT's entry into force CTBT
Five NWS, India and Pakistan maintain a moratorium on nuclear test explosions. Israel, which has kept its nuclear policy opaque, has not disclosed the possibility of conducting nuclear tests. North Korea conducted a third nuclear test explosion in February 2013. The UN Security Council “decide[d] that the DPRK shall not conduct any further launches that use ballistic missile technology, nuclear tests or any other provocation” in the Resolution 2094 adopted in March. However, North Korea has yet to declare a moratorium.
C) Cooperation with the CTBTO Preparatory Commission
Regarding the countries surveyed in this study, the status of payments of contributions to the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO for 2012 is as follows.
Ø Fully paid: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE and the U.K.
Ø Partially paid: Brazil and the U.S.
Ø Voting right in the Preparatory Commission suspended because arrears are equal to or larger than its contributions due for the last two years: Iran
The United States has pledged a voluntary contribution of US$ 3,450 thousand to the CTBTO for bolstering the CTBT verification regime, especially to preparations for the next Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) in Jordan in November-December 2014.
D) Contribution to the development of the CTBT verification systems
As mentioned at the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2013, the fact that the IMS successfully detected the unusual event at the time of the North Korean nuclear tests demonstrated the effectiveness of the CTBT verification systems. The pace of establishing the IMS stations in China, Egypt and Iran has been lagging behind, compared to that in the other signatory countries. Among them, the CTBTO announced the important progress that “China has agreed to begin sharing data from 10 stations on its territory,” followed by the announcement of the CTBTO on January 6, 2014 that CTBTO has started receiving data from key IMS stations hosted by China.
Another significant contribution was that a new system for Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM), which is used to backtrack the movement of airborne radioactive material or to simulate the travel path of the radionuclides, once an emission’s location is known, derived from a nuclear test, was installed at the headquarters of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission through a voluntary contribution by Japan of around U.S.$ 737,000. The new system could increase the resolution of ATM calculations significantly.
Regarding the on-site inspections, an exercise was undertaken in Hungary from May-June 2013, in which 150 experts of the member countries and the CTBTO participated. In addition, the next Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) will be conducted in Jordan in November-December 2014, as mentioned above. The United Kingdom hosted a Technical Experts Meeting by NWS in March 2013 to discuss the technical collaborative work for the upcoming exercise, based on their experience with past nuclear explosive tests.
E) Nuclear Testing
North Korea announced that it “succeeded in the third underground nuclear test at the site for underground nuclear test” at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site on February 2013. The size of this nuclear test was calculated to have a magnitude of 4.9, whose explosive power was approximately two times larger than the prior test conducted in May 2009. The test was detected by 94 seismic stations and two infrasound stations of the CTBTO’s IMS. Although radionuclide was not detected at first, the CTBTO announced in April that its “radionuclide network [had] made a significant detection of radioactive noble gases [Xe-133 and Xe-131m] that could be attributed to the nuclear test” at the radionuclide stations in Takasaki (Japan) and Ussuriysk (Russia) two months after the North’s test. It remains unclear whether North Korea used highly-enriched uranium or plutonium for the tested nuclear explosive devise.
Soon after the nuclear test, North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a statement: “The current nuclear test is the primary countermeasure taken by the DPRK in which it exercised its maximum self-restraint. If the U.S. takes a hostile approach toward the DPRK to the last, rendering the situation complicated, it will be left with no option but to take the second and third stronger steps in succession.” At the end of 2013, North Korea conducted neither a successive nuclear test nor a further flight test of any long-range ballistic missiles. However, the U.S. expert analyzed that North Korea continued to excavate at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and upgrade the site’s support areas although there were “no signs that Pyongyang plans to conduct a nuclear test in the immediate future.”
Other nuclear-weapon/armed states did not conduct any nuclear explosive tests in 2013. On the other hand, the United States continues to develop and conduct various non-explosive tests and experiments in the framework of the Stockpile Stewardship Program in order to sustain and assess the nuclear weapons stockpile without the use of underground nuclear tests. The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is part of the U.S. Department of Energy, has released quarterly reports on such experiments. Based on its press release, the NNSA conducted two experiments using the Z machine during April and June, and during July and September at the Sandia National Laboratories. The Z machine generates X-rays by fast discharge of capacitors, thus allowing for exploring the properties of plutonium materials under extreme pressures and temperatures. The status of the other nuclear-weapon/armed states’ non-explosive testing activities in this respect is not well-known since they do not release any information.
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
 “Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York, September 27, 2013.
 “Statement by China,” at the 2013 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York, 27 September 2013.
 “Statement by Israel,” at the 2013 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York, 27 September 2013.
 “Statement by the United States of America,” at the 2013 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York, 27 September 2013.
 CTBT-Art.XIV/2013/4, 6 September 2013.
 On the ATOM Project, see its homepage (http://theatomproject.org/en/).
 “CTBTO Member States’ Payment as at 31-Dec-2012,” http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/treasury/31Dec2012_Member_States__payments.pdf.
 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization, “Voluntary Contribution by the United States,” 6 September 2013, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2013/voluntary-contribution-by-the-united-states/.
 “China Promises to Ante Up Nuclear-Monitoring Data,” Science Insider, August 8, 2013, http://news.sciencemag.org/2013/08/china-promises-ante-nuclear-monitoring-data.
 Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization, “Chinese Monitoring Stations Now Sending Data,” 6 January 2014, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2014/chinese-monitoring-stations-now-sending-data/.
 “Japan's Intense Cooperation with the CTBTO,” Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, November 26, 2013, http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2013/japans-intense-cooperation-with-the-ctbto/.
 “Detecting a Site of Nuclear Test: A New System Introduced by the CTBTO,” Kyodo News, November 27, 2013. (in Japanese)
 Rachel Oswald, “North Korean Nuclear Test More Than Twice as Powerful as Last Blast,” Global Security Newswire, February 19, 2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/north-korea-nuke-test-estimated-25-times-more-powerful-2009-blast/.
 “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry Urges U.S. to Choose Between Two Options,” KCNA, February 12, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201302/news12/20130212-19ee.html.
 See NNSA, “Stockpile Stewardship Program Quarterly Experiments,” http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile/sspquarterly.