(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
Back to the Contents
A) Conclusion of the IAEA Safeguards Agreements
Under Article III-1 of the NPT, “[e]ach Non-nuclear-weapon
State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards as set forth in an
agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification
of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.” The basic structure and content of the
safeguards agreement are specified in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
(CSA). To date, 12 NPT NNWS have yet to conclude CSAs with the IAEA.[1]
An NPT NNWS or any other state may also conclude a protocol additional to its
safeguards agreement, or the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP). As of September 2013,
116 NPT NNWS have ratified the APs. New ratifying countries in 2013 were Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Vietnam.
The IAEA Secretariat can draw the so-called
“broader conclusion” that “all nuclear material in the State has remained in
peaceful activities” when the Agency finds no indications of diversion of
declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and undeclared
nuclear material or activities in that country. The IAEA can draw such a
conclusion in a credible manner only in a state with both the CSA and the AP in
force. Subsequently, the IAEA implements integrated safeguards defined as the
“optimized combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under
[CSAs] and [APs], to maximize effectiveness and efficiency within available
resources.”
The current status of the signature and ratification
of the CSAs and the APs and the implementation of the integrated safeguards by
the NPT NNWS studied in this project is presented in the following table.
(Table 2-1)
B) Compliance with the IAEA Safeguards
Agreement
Under Article XII-C of the Statute of the
IAEA, the IAEA “Board shall report the non-compliance [with safeguards
agreements] to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of
the United Nations.” Up to now, three cases of non-compliance have been
reported to the UN Security Council and have yet to be solved: North Korea, Iran
and Syria.
With regard to North Korea, it asked the
IAEA to remove seals and surveillance from the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon
and to leave the country in April 2009. Since then, no safeguards measures in
North Korea have been implemented by the IAEA.[2]
As for Syria, the international community
as well as the IAEA has suspected that the Dair Alzour site, which was
destroyed by an Israeli air raid in September 2007, was a clandestinely
constructed, undeclared nuclear reactor. In August 2013, the IAEA reported that “the Agency [had] not received any new information
from Syria or other Member States that would have an impact on the Agency’s assessment
of the nature of the destroyed building at the Dair Alzour site.” The IAEA also
“informed Syria that…the 2013 physical inventory verification at the [Miniature
Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)] would be postponed until the security conditions
had sufficiently improved.”[3] Meanwhile, Syria declared the small
amount of nuclear material at the MNSR.
Iran has accepted the IAEA inspections on
its declared nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, under the CSA. However,
as indicated again in the report by the IAEA Director-General in August 2013, “[w]hile
the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material
at the nuclear facilities and [Location Outside Facilities (LOFs)] declared by
Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran is not providing the necessary
cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency
is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear
material in Iran is in peaceful activities.” This report also pointed out that:
“[t]he Agency has not been able to begin substantive work with Iran on
resolving the outstanding issues, including those related to possible military
dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme”; and “Iran continues not to implement
modified Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, notwithstanding
statements it has made in relation to the construction of new research
reactors, new uranium enrichment facilities and new power reactors.”[4]
Iran, on the other hand, sent an
explanatory note to the IAEA on the IAEA report, and strongly criticized that “[t]he
report [was] not balanced and factual…[and] the claims and baseless allegations
against Islamic Republic of Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities as contained in
the DG report…[were] unprofessional, unfair, illegal and politicized.” Furthermore,
Iran states in the explanatory note that “[a]s the result of Iran’s proactive
cooperation all outstanding issues…[had been] resolved by 2008 and reported by
the former Director General to the Board of Governors.”[5]
However, the relationship between Iran and
the IAEA has gradually changed after the inauguration of President Rouhani.
They concluded the Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation at the
meeting in November 2013
and agreed, among other issues, the following points:[6]
Ø Iran and the IAEA will cooperate further with respect to
verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and
past issues. It is foreseen that Iran's cooperation will include providing the
IAEA with timely information about its nuclear facilities and in regard to the
implementation of transparency measures.
Ø The IAEA agreed to continue to take into account Iran's security
concerns including through the use of managed access and the protection of
confidential information.
Ø As a first step, Iran and the IAEA agreed to the practical measures
listed in the attached Annex. Iran will provide the access and information
within three months from the date of this Statement. The IAEA will report to
the Board of Governors on progress in the implementation of these measures.
In the attached Annex of the Joint
Statement, the following measures are listed: providing mutually agreed
relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas, and
to the Heavy Water Production Plant near Arak; clarification of the
announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities; and further
clarification of the announcement made by Iran with respect to laser enrichment
technology. However, the
pending matter of how to handle the Parchin site was
not listed in the Joint Statement.
In the Joint Plan of Action concluded between
the E3+3 and Iran in November 2013, the following measures for enhancing
monitoring as the elements of a first step were agreed:
Ø Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including
information on Iran’s plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each
building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for
each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium
mines and mills, and information on source material
Ø Submission of an updated design information questionnaire (DIQ) for
the IR-40 at Arak
Ø Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards
Approach for the IR-40
Ø Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the
purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification,
Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose
of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz
Ø IAEA inspector managed access to: centrifuge assembly workshops; centrifuge
rotor production workshop and storage facilities; and uranium mines and mills
Despite the significance of the Joint Plan
of Action, the E3+3 and Iran have yet to agree on measures for
solving certain “outstanding issues,” particularly the
dispute regarding the Parchin site. On this point, one U.S. expert analyzed that “Iran
appear[ed] to be in the final stages of modifying the suspected high explosive
test site at the Parchin complex, having recently asphalted large sections of
the site,” which makes it difficult to conduct any IAEA inspection
for verifying whether Iran conducted nuclear weapons-related activities.[7]
※
In June 2013, it was reported that the classified
IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report was leaked. According to the media source
citing this Report, the following issues, inter alia, were included:[8]
Ø For 71 of 159 member states, the IAEA "was not able to get
timely responses to agency requests for, or clarification of, safeguards
relevant information", without naming them.
Ø Brazil, China and Georgia were among the 159-member countries that
most consistently responded late to IAEA requests.
Ø The IAEA conducted 1,962 on-site inspections in 2012, with 215
taking place in Iran.
Ø Inspections in Iran consumed over 12 percent of the IAEA budget for
the safeguards.
Ø IAEA investigators spent 1,356 calendar days in Iran last year
visiting its nuclear facilities (180 calendar days in France, 16 calendar days
in Russia, and 50 calendar days in the United States).
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
[1] The 12 NNWS either have nuclear material in small quantity or
conduct no nuclear activity.
[2] See, for example, GOV/2012/36-GC(56)/11, 30 August 2012.
[3] GOV/2013/41, 28 August 2013.
[4] GOV/2013/40, 28 August 2013.
[5] INFCIRC/854, 26 September 2013.
[6] “Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation,” signed by the
IAEA and Iran, 11 November 2013, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/2013/prn201321.html.
[7] David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Update on the Parchin Site,” ISIS Report, August 22, 2013, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/august-22-2013-update-on-the-parchin-site-by-david-albright-and-robert-avag/8#images.
[8] Jonathan Tirone, “UN Atomic Agency Says 70 Countries Join Iran
Shirking Duty,” Bloomberg, June 6,
2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/un-atomic-agency-says-70-countries-joined-iran-in-shirking-duty.html;
“Iran not U.N. Nuclear Watchdog's Only Headache, Report Shows,” Reuters, June 7, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/07/us-nuclear-iaea-safeguards-idUSBRE9560OS20130607;
Mark Hibbs, “Safeguards in the Spotlight,” Arms
Control Wonk, 9 June 2013, http://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1878/safeguards-in-the-spotlight.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Comment?