The Hiroshima Report 2014 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
--Exective Summary (in Japanese and English)
The Hiroshima Report 2012 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)

January 6, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(3) Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!

A) Reduction of nuclear weapons

Russia and the United States continue to undertake reductions of their strategic nuclear weapons under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). The status of their strategic (nuclear) delivery vehicles and warheads under the Treaty has been periodically updated in the U.S. State Department homepage (see table 1-2 below).

(Table 1-2)

The number of warheads cited above does not accurately reflect the actual situation of nuclear forces in both countries due to the Treaty’s counting rule.[1] On the other hand, the United States disclosed the aggregate numbers, including a breakdown by individual nuclear weapon systems and delivery vehicles in March 2013.[2]

The number of U.S. deployed strategic warheads and strategic delivery vehicles in September 2013 slightly increased compared to their numbers of six months ago. One U.S. expert analyzed this issue as follows:
“We will have to wait a few months for the full aggregate data set to be declassified to see the details of what has happened. But it probably reflects fluctuations mainly in the number of missiles onboard ballistic missile submarines at the time of the count. …The increase in counted deployed forces does not mean that the United States has begun to build up is nuclear forces.”[3]
He also pointed out that “the United States has still not begun reducing its operational nuclear forces. Instead, it has worked on reducing so-called phantom weapons that have been retired from the nuclear mission but are still counted under the treaty.”[4]

Since the entry into force of the New START, an alleged noncompliance issue has not raised between two countries. In January 2013, the U.S. State Department stated in the annual report that “[b]ased on the information available as of December 31, 2012, the United States certifies the Russian Federation to be in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty.”[5]

In May 2010, the United States disclosed the number of nuclear warheads it had possessed as of September 30, 2009 (not including several thousand retired warheads awaiting dismantlement). Since then, neither the United States nor Russia has declared the number of nuclear weapons possessed, except the status of their strategic (nuclear) delivery vehicles and warheads under the New START mentioned above. The U.S. expert estimates that the U.S. nuclear stockpiles in 2013 consist of 4,650 warheads and 800 delivery vehicles, having reduced 560 nuclear warheads since September 2009, including 260 W80-0 warheads for the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM/N), which was retired in 2013.[6] On the other hand, Russia reiterated the status of its non-strategic nuclear weapons at the 2013 NPT PrepCom as following:
“[T]he Russian Federation has reduced by 3/4 the number of its non-strategic nuclear weapons. Today, the non-strategic nuclear potential of Russia does not exceed 25% of that the USSR had in 1991. At the same time, all Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons were undeployed; they are located exclusively within the national territory, and are stored in centralized highly secure storage facilities.[7]

As for other nuclear-weapon/armed states, while there is little significant progress on nuclear weapons reductions in 2013, France stated at the 2013 NPT PrepCom that it “met the target of reducing the air component of [its] deterrence force by one third” in the previous year.[8] 

B) A concrete plan for further reduction of nuclear weapons

As mentioned above, U.S. President Obama announced in his Berlin speech on June 19, 2013: “After a comprehensive review, I’ve determined that we can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third. And I intend to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures.” He also stated that the United States would “work with [its] NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical weapons in Europe.”[9] According to his speech, the United States envisages to reduce U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the level of 1,000-1,100 respectively.

In the Berlin speech, President Obama did not mention pursuing any new bilateral arms control treaty, although he denies a possibility of unilateral nuclear reduction. Instead, the Obama administration seems to seek parallel, reciprocal reductions of strategic nuclear arsenals with Russia without codifying a legally-binding treaty due to the difficulty to achieve an approval by two-thirds of the Senate for ratification. The Senate Republicans, in particular, have insisted that the administration should not reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenals through unilateral or non-binding bilateral measures, which do not require Senate deliberation or consent.[10]

Contrary to President Obama’s commitments to further nuclear reduction, it should be pointed out that the Nuclear Employment Strategy Report includes some measures and guidance that may have an effect on limiting actual cuts. For example, the Report indicates that:[11]
Ø  “The United States will maintain a sufficient number of non-deployed weapons to hedge against the technical failure of any single weapon type or delivery system at a time, …[and] provide intra-led hedge options—i.e., uploading another warhead type from within a leg of the Triad in the event that a particular warhead fails.”
Ø  The U.S. Defense Department “should maintain legacy weapons to hedge against the failure of weapons undergoing life-extension only until confidence in each Life-Extension Program (LEP) is attained.”
Ø  “A non-deployed hedge…will also provide the United States the credibility to upload additional weapons in response to geopolitical developments that alter our assessment of U.S. deployed force requirements.”
Furthermore, the Report mentions that the United States will “maintain significant counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries.”[12] Generally speaking, counterforce strategy, which necessitates setting more targets than countervalue strategy, tends to inhibit reductions of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems.

Russia has expressed its reluctance to accept the Obama proposal on further nuclear cuts. Soon after the Berlin speech, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated the Russian position that Russia and the United States needed to take into consideration various factors affecting strategic stability—such as development of missile defenses, weaponization of outer space and imbalance of conventional forces—when they engage in further nuclear weapons reductions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov also argued that Russia could not “indefinitely and bilaterally talk with the United States about cuts and restrictions on nuclear weapons in a situation where a whole number of other countries are expanding their nuclear and missile potentials,” – in short, that further reduction of nuclear weapons should be reviewed in a multilateral context.[13]

On reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), the Obama administration has not made any concrete proposal, beyond expressing its intention to promote their reduction made in the Berlin speech and so on. In the Nuclear Employment Strategy Report, the United States indicated that its NSNWs—dual-capable aircraft—remain to play a certain role for “extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. Allies and partners,” and that it should maintain a forward-based posture in Europe.[14]

NATO has also not made any concrete proposal or direction regarding a reduction of NSNWs. However, in the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) issued in May 2012, NATO showed its readiness to discuss major cuts in forward-based NSNWs stationed in NATO on a mutual basis with Russia.[15] In February 2013, NATO agreed on the mandate of its new arms control body, the “Special Advisory and Consultative Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Committee,” for preparing a dialogue on confidence building and transparency measures on tactical weapons with Russia.[16] In April, NATO Secretary General Anders F. Rasmussen stated that NATO had started to consider measures for reducing tactical nuclear weapons with a range below 500 km. He also stated that their reduction would be dependent on Russia’s will and should maintain a balance through reciprocal measures between NATO and Russia.[17]

Russia has not shown its willingness to reduce its NSNWs, which are considered an important instrument to complement Russian conventional forces inferior to those of the United States and NATO. Rather, Russia has proposed NSNWs disarmament, which is to be conducted by other countries. For example, Russia stated in the 2013 NPT PrepCom as following:
“We have repeatedly called on other countries possessing non-strategic nuclear weapons to follow the example of the Russian Federation and transfer those weapons to their territories, eliminate all infrastructures that allows their prompt deployment abroad and cease preparations for their use with engagement of the military from non-nuclear States. We are convinced that such steps would promote strengthening of international security and stability. We have to state that our calls still remain unanswered.”[18]
Furthermore, Russia proposed to make the bilateral INF Treaty “universal and come to a legally binding arrangement on complete elimination of such weapons.”[19]

The NPDI called for taking the following measures on NSNWs reductions, among others, in the working paper issued at the NPT PrepCom:[20]
Ø  reviewing promptly deployment posture of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of their declaratory policies;
Ø  providing information; and
Ø  as a first step on the way to the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, ensuring and increasing transparency with respect to the current status of the implementation of the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives and possible verification of such implementation.

C) Trends on strengthening/modernizing nuclear weapons capabilities

All nuclear-weapon/armed states continue to modernize and/or strengthen their nuclear weapons capabilities.

The United States has stated its commitment “not to develop new nuclear warheads or pursue new military missions for nuclear weapons.”[21] The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is planning to consolidate four variations of the existing B61 nuclear gravity bombs into a single version, named B61 mod 12, incorporating technology for improving safety and reliability, and equipping tail kits for increased accuracy. The NNSA denies that a new capability or mission will be added for the B61-12. The U.S. government has also been studying to develop follow-on ICBMs, SLBMs, Long Range Strike-Bombers and Long-Range Stand-off weapons for replacing the existing U.S. strategic delivery systems that entered service in the Cold War era.[22]

Russia continues to develop new strategic nuclear delivery systems for replacing its aging ICBMs and SLBMs. In May 2011, Commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Force, Sergey Karakayev, “affirmed the strategic missile force would be 98% modernized by 2021.”[23] In 2013, he “announced that by the end of the year, his service [would] add 15 RS-24 Yars missiles to the divisions in Novosibirsk and Nizhniy Tagil.”[24] Russia also plans to begin construction of a prototype of a new heavy liquid-fuel ICBM in 2014,[25] which it is expected to deploy in 2018-2010, according to Commander Karakayev.[26] Furthermore, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin told that Russia was developing an additional new ICBM, called a “missile defense killer,” that is able to penetrate missile defense (MD) systems.[27] In December, the Russian Defense Ministry disclosed deployment of Iskander SRBMs in the Kaliningrad region.[28] However, President Putin said: “One of the possible responses [to a U.S. deployment of MD system in Europe] is to deploy Iskander complexes in Kaliningrad ... but I want to draw your attention to the fact that we have not yet made this decision”[29] Russia’s possession and deployment of Iskander with range of 400km, which is capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads, is not prohibited under the INF Treaty. As for its sea-based deterrent, Russia is proceeding with the plan to construct eight Borei-class SSBNs by 2020. It is reported that construction of a fifth submarine would begin in late 2014.[30] In October 2013, Russia put forward a federal budget proposal “to increase annual spending on nuclear weapons by more than 50 percent in the next three years.”[31]

The United Kingdom published the Trident Alternative Review report in July 2013, which examined alternative options for a replacement of Vanguard-class SSBNs —nuclear-armed SLBMs, nuclear-armed cruise missiles, aircraft, maritime surface vessel, SSNs, SSBNs and SSGNs. Although the review did not recommend any particular option, the report seemed to imply that the like-for-like replacement—replacing by SSBNs—would be preferable in order to maintain the U.K. independent nuclear deterrence from viewpoints of, among others, value of deterrence and cost for research and development. The report also pointed out the possibility that the existing continuous at-sea deterrence (CASD) would not be sustained if the number of U.K. SSBNs were to be reduced from four to three.[32]

China is widely believed to continue aggressive modernization of its nuclear forces, although it has released very little information on its efforts. According to the Annual Report on China’s Military, published by the U.S. Defense Department, “China may…be developing a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).”[33] In July and December 2013, China was reported to have conducted the first and the second flight tests, respectively, of a new road-mobile, MIRVed ICBM Dong Feng-41 (DF-41), which is estimated to have a range of 11,000-12,000km and capable to mount up to 10 warheads per a missile.[34]

China’s three JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094) are considered to be operational. Two more JIN-class SSBNs are to be constructed and operational before proceeding to a next generation SSBN. The JIN-class SSBNs will carry JL-2 SLBMs with an estimated range of 7,400 km. The United States assessed that the JL-2 would reach initial operational capability in 2013.[35] However, its actual status is not clear. China is considered to have a plan for strengthening its nuclear deterrent through the introduction of new generation SSGNs (Type 095) and SSBNs (Type 096, Tang-class).

Two nuclear-armed states in South Asia also continue to develop ballistic missiles, but their focuses are different. India conducted a flight test of Agni-5, land-based ballistic missiles with range of 5,000 km, in September 2013. It also plans to develop a MIRVed ICBM Agni-6 with a range of 6,000 km.[36] On the other hand, Pakistan seems to prioritize development and deployment of short- and medium-range missiles for ensuring deterrence vis-à-vis India. In February and November 2013, Pakistan succeeded in testing Hatf-IX (Nasr) SRBMs with range of 60 km.[37] Pakistan also conducted a flight test of the nuclear-capable Hatf-II with range of 180 km.[38] The number of nuclear warheads they possess are estimated to gradually increase.

North Korea maintains nuclear- and missile-related activities despite the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2094 in March 2013, in which the Security Council reinforced international censure against such. On March 31, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared at the Supreme People's Assembly that it would bolster nuclear weapons development concurrently with enhancing economic development.[39]

In March 2013, Vice Defense Minister Kang Pyo Yong stated that North Korea’s “intercontinental ballistic missiles and other missiles are on standby, loaded with lighter, smaller and diversified nuclear warheads,”[40] while it is not confirmed whether  the North actually possesses such capabilities. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concluded with “moderate confidence” that North Korea might have nuclear warheads miniaturized for loading ballistic missiles whose reliability would be low.[41] In addition, South Korean Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin gave an estimation, at the National Assembly on November 20, that North Korea could build a nuclear weapon using uranium.[42] As for ballistic missile-related activities, according to analyses by a U.S. expert, North Korea “has embarked on a major construction program at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (commonly referred to at “Tongchang-ri”)…since mid-2013,”[43] and “probably tested a long-range rocket engine”[44] there in 2013. A development of a new long-range ballistic missile KN-08 is also likely to proceed.[45] Samuel Locklear, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, stated:
“For our military planning perspective, when I see KN-08 road-mobile missiles that appear in a North Korean military parade, I am bound to take that serious, both for not only the peninsula but also the region, as well as my own homeland should we speculate that those missiles potentially have the technology to reach out. …Whether they are real or not, or whether they have the capability or not, [the] North Korean regime wants us to think they do and so we plan for that.”[46]

(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)

[1] The New START treaty counts a heavy bomber as one delivery system and one nuclear warhead, despite the fact that the bombers can actually load 6-20 warheads. Also, according to its counting rule, “for ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs.”
[2] “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of States, July 1, 2013,
[3] Hans M. Kristensen, “New START Data Shows Russia Reducing, US Increasing Nuclear Forces,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, October 2, 2013,
[4] Ibid.
[5] U.S. Department of State, “Annual Report on Implementation of the New START Treaty,” January 2013,
[6] Hans M. Krintensen and Robert S. Norris, “US Nuclear Forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 2 (2013), pp. 77-86.
[7] “Statement by the Russian Federation,” at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Cluster I, Geneva, April 25, 2013.
[8] “Statement by the H.E. Mr. Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament,” Second Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference (Geneva, 22 April- 3 May 2013), General Debate, Geneva, 22 April 2013.
[9] “Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate,” Berlin, June 19, 2013, http://www.
[10] See, for example, Amy F. Woolf, “Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, June 19, 2013.
[11] U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Employment Strategy Report,” p. 7.
[12] Ibid., p. 4.
[13] “Nuclear Arms Reduction Deals to Become Multilateral – Lavrov,” RIA Novosti, 22 June 2013,; Kathleen Hennessey and Paul Richter, “Obama Seeks Further Cuts to U.S., Russia Nuclear Arsenals,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 2013,
[14] U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Employment Strategy Report,” p. 6.
[15] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Deterrence and Defense Posture Review,” May 20, 2012,
[16] Oliver Meier, “NATO Agrees on New Arms Control Body,” Arms Control Now, February 26, 2013,
[17] “Contemplating Reduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Mainichi Newspapers, April 11, 2013. (in Japanese).
[18] “Statement by the Russian Federation,” at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Cluster I, Geneva, April 25, 2013.
[19] Ibid.
[20] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.3, 6 March 2013.
[21] “Statement by Thomas Countryman, Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State, United States of America,” General Debate, at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee, 2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 22,2013.
[22] On the U.S. modernization of nuclear weapons capabilities, see, for example, testimonies and debates at the Senate Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, United States Senate, April 17, 2013.
[23] Mark B. Schneider, “Russian Nuclear Modernization,” Talking Points from Remarks Made to an Air Force Association, National Defense Industrial Association and Reserve Officers Association Seminar, June 20, 2012, p. 7.
[24] “15 RS-24 Yars Missiles to be Deployed by the End of 2013,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 17, 2013,
[25] “Russia to Start Building Prototype of New Heavy ICBM in 2014,” RIA Novosti, 18 June 2013,
[26] “Sarmat Heavy ICBM Expected to be Ready in 2018-2020,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 17, 2013,
[27] “Russia Tests ‘Missile Defense Killer,’” RIA Novosti, 7 June 2013,
[28] “Russia is Fielding Nuclear-Capable Missiles in Territory Bordering NATO,” Global Security Newswire, December 17, 2013,
[29] “Putin Says Missiles not yet Deployed to Kaliningrad Region,” Reuters, December 19, 2013,
[30] “Russia to Start Building 5th Borey Nuclear Sub in 2014,” RIA Novosti, November 13, 2013,
[31] “Russia to Up Nuclear Weapons Spending 50% by 2016,” RIA Novosti, 8 October 2013,
[32] United Kingdom, Trident Alternative Review, 16 July 2013.
[33] U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, p. 31.
[34] Bill Gertz, “China Conducts Second Flight Test of New Long-Range Missile,” Washinton Free Beacon, December 17, 2013,
[35] U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, p. 31.
[36] “Agni-VI All Set to Take Shape,” The Hindu, February 4, 2013,; “Advanced Agni-6 Missile with Multiple Warheads Likely by 2017,” Business Standard, May 8, 2013,
[37] “Pakistan Successfully Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Hatf-IX Missile,” The Indian Express, February 11, 2013,; “Pakistan Successfully Test Fires Hatf IX,” Dawn, November 5, 2013,
[38] Pakistan Successfully Tests Nuclear-Capable Hatf-II Missile,” Indian Express, February 15, 2013,
[39] “North Korea Declares ‘State of War’ With South,” Global Newswire, April 1, 2013,
[40] “N. Korea Unable to Reach U.S. with Missiles, but Asia Allies Vulnerable,” Global Security Newswire, March 8, 2013,
[41] “North Korea Can Put a Nuke on a Missile, U.S. Intelligence Agency Believes,” ABC News, April 11, 2013,
[42] “N. Korea Can Produce Uranium-Based Nuclear Bomb: Seoul's Defense Chief,” Yonhap News Agency, November 20, 2013,
[43] Nick Hansen, “Major Construction at the Sohae Rocket Test Site,” 38 North, 30 August 2013,
[44] Nick Hansen, “Probable Rocket Engine Test Conducted at Sohae,” 38 North, 23 September 2013,
[45] Jeffrey Lewis and John Schilling, “Real Fake Missiles: North Korea’s ICBM Mockups Are Getting Scary Good,” 38 North, November 4, 2013,
[46] “U.S. Admiral Taking Threat of North Korean ICBMs Seriously,” Global Security Newswire, November 6, 2013,

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