(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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One of the most important measures to
strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system is to promote the
universal application of the Additional Protocol. Among the countries surveyed
in this project, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States consider that the AP is “an
integral part” of the current IAEA safeguards system.[1]
Although it adopts a more moderate position, China also is of the opinion that “[i]t is necessary to strengthen the
safeguards function of the IAEA and promote the universality of the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol.”[2] At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, Switzerland,
which is interested in optimizing the IAEA safeguards system, issued a working
paper on strengthening cooperation between the IAEA and states.[3] Countries like Brazil, Russia and South Africa consider that the conclusion
of an AP should be voluntary, not obligatory, although they acknowledge the importance
of the AP with regard to safeguards, as a major component of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime. The NAM countries also argue that “it is fundamental
to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary
confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be
turned into legal safeguards obligations.”[4]
Japan and the other Western countries have
actively conducted outreach activities towards states that have yet to conclude
an AP. For example, at the 2013 NPT PrepCom, Japan introduced its efforts to
support other countries’ conclusion of the AP through sharing knowledge.[5]
In addition, some of the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreements
recently concluded by Japan and the United States with NNWS, stipulate that the
partner states’ conclusion of an AP is one of the conditions for their cooperation.
Regarding research and development of the
safeguards technology, the IAEA issued the Development and Implementation
Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 2012-2013 in 2012. Based on this new,
two-year plan, 24 projects will be undertaken with the support of the 21 states
that participated in the support programme under the previous biennial plan.[6]
The numbers of the member state support program (MSSP) tasks carried out by the
states studied in this project are: the
United States (58), the United Kingdom (31), France (27), Germany (23), Japan (14),
Sweden (13), South Korea (12), Russia (11), Australia (8), Belgium (8), Brazil
(8), South Africa (4), and China (3).[7]
In January 2013, the IAEA published the “IAEA
Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012-2013.” In this report,
the IAEA listed the following seven areas of long-term capabilities, for which
further research and development are needed, in order to meet its strategic
objectives for strengthening the safeguards: Concepts and approaches; Detection of undeclared
nuclear material and activities; Safeguards equipment and communication; Information
technology, collection, analysis and security; Analytical services; New
mandates; and Training.[8]
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
[1] See, for example, statements made by those countries at the 2013
NPT PrepCom.
[2] “Statement by China,” Cluster 2, the Second Preparatory Committee
for the 2015 NPR Review Conference, April 26, 2013.
[3] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.33, 17 April 2013. また、”Statement by Switzerland,” Cluster 2, the
Second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference2013, 26 April
2013を参照。
[4] “Statement by the Republic of Indonesia on Behalf of the Group of
Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement,” Cluster 2, the Second Preparatory
Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 26 April 2013.
[5] “Statement by Japan,” Cluster 2, the Second Preparatory Committee
for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 26 April 2013.
[6] IAEA, Development and
Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 2012-2013.
[7] Ibid. For the MSSP tasks where a multiple number of states take
part, they are counted as one task under all relevant countries. Also, those
numbers do not reflect the level of importance of the tasks or budget.
[8] IAEA, “IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan,
2012-2013,” January 2013.
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