Introduction

The Hiroshima Report 2014 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
--Exective Summary (in Japanese and English)
The Hiroshima Report 2012 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)

January 28, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 2-(4) Cooperation with the IAEA

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

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One of the most important measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system is to promote the universal application of the Additional Protocol. Among the countries surveyed in this project, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, the United Kingdom and the United States consider that the AP is “an integral part” of the current IAEA safeguards system.[1] Although it adopts a more moderate position, China also is of the opinion that “[i]t is necessary to strengthen the safeguards function of the IAEA and promote the universality of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol.”[2] At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, Switzerland, which is interested in optimizing the IAEA safeguards system, issued a working paper on strengthening cooperation between the IAEA and states.[3] Countries like Brazil, Russia and South Africa consider that the conclusion of an AP should be voluntary, not obligatory, although they acknowledge the importance of the AP with regard to safeguards, as a major component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The NAM countries also argue that “it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations.”[4]

Japan and the other Western countries have actively conducted outreach activities towards states that have yet to conclude an AP. For example, at the 2013 NPT PrepCom, Japan introduced its efforts to support other countries’ conclusion of the AP through sharing knowledge.[5] In addition, some of the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreements recently concluded by Japan and the United States with NNWS, stipulate that the partner states’ conclusion of an AP is one of the conditions for their cooperation.

Regarding research and development of the safeguards technology, the IAEA issued the Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 2012-2013 in 2012. Based on this new, two-year plan, 24 projects will be undertaken with the support of the 21 states that participated in the support programme under the previous biennial plan.[6] The numbers of the member state support program (MSSP) tasks carried out by the states studied in this project are: the United States (58), the United Kingdom (31), France (27), Germany (23), Japan (14), Sweden (13), South Korea (12), Russia (11), Australia (8), Belgium (8), Brazil (8), South Africa (4), and China (3).[7]

In January 2013, the IAEA published the “IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012-2013.” In this report, the IAEA listed the following seven areas of long-term capabilities, for which further research and development are needed, in order to meet its strategic objectives for strengthening the safeguards: Concepts and approaches; Detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities; Safeguards equipment and communication; Information technology, collection, analysis and security; Analytical services; New mandates; and Training.[8]

(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)



[1] See, for example, statements made by those countries at the 2013 NPT PrepCom.
[2] “Statement by China,” Cluster 2, the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPR Review Conference, April 26, 2013.
[3] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.33, 17 April 2013. また、”Statement by Switzerland,” Cluster 2, the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference2013, 26 April 2013を参照。
[4] “Statement by the Republic of Indonesia on Behalf of the Group of Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement,” Cluster 2, the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 26 April 2013.
[5] “Statement by Japan,” Cluster 2, the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 26 April 2013.
[6] IAEA, Development and Implementation Support Programme for Nuclear Verification 2012-2013.
[7] Ibid. For the MSSP tasks where a multiple number of states take part, they are counted as one task under all relevant countries. Also, those numbers do not reflect the level of importance of the tasks or budget.
[8] IAEA, “IAEA Department of Safeguards Long-Term R&D Plan, 2012-2013,” January 2013.

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