(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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In addition to accepting the IAEA safeguards, as described earlier, a state should aim to be fully transparent about its nuclear-related activities and future plans, in order to demonstrate that it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons. A state that concludes an AP with the IAEA is obliged to provide information on its general plans for the next ten-year period relevant to the development of its nuclear fuel cycle (including nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities). Major countries actively promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy have issued mid- or long-term nuclear development plans, including the construction of nuclear power plants. The international community may be concerned about the possible development of nuclear weapon programs when states conduct nuclear activities without publishing their nuclear development plans (e.g. Israel, North Korea, and Syria), or are engaged in nuclear activities which seem inconsistent with their plans, capabilities and technologies (e.g. Iran).
From the standpoint of transparency, the communications received by the IAEA from certain member states concerning their policies regarding the management of plutonium, including the amount of plutonium held in each country, are also important. Using the format of the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC/549) agreed in 1997, the 5 NWS, Belgium, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland annually report the amount of civil unirradiated plutonium under their control. By November 2013, China, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have declared their civilian plutonium holdings as of December 2012. France, Germany and the United Kingdom have reported their holdings of not only civil plutonium but also HEU.
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Iran, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Turkey and the UAE have published the amount of fissile material holdings or at least have accepted placing their declared nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. From this, it may be concluded that these states have given clear evidence of transparency about their civil nuclear activities.