(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
A NWS is not required to conclude the CSA
with the IAEA. However, to alleviate the concerns about the discriminatory
nature of the NPT, the NWS have voluntarily agreed to apply safeguards to some
of their nuclear facilities and fissile material that are not involved in
military activities. All NWS have also concluded an AP with the IAEA.
The IAEA Annual Report 2012 lists facilities
under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material in NWS as of
31 December 2012, as below.[1]
The IAEA does not publish the number of inspections conducted in the NWS.
Ø
China:
A power reactor, a research reactor, and an enrichment plant
Ø
France:
A fuel fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, and an enrichment plant
Ø
Russia:
A separate storage facility
Ø
The
United Kingdom: An enrichment plant and three separate storage facilities
Ø
The
United States: A separate storage facility
At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, the United States
reported that it had “made
over 290 nuclear facilities eligible for IAEA
safeguards under [its] Voluntary Offer safeguards agreement, and under [its] Additional
Protocol declared over 330 nuclear-related activities and hosted complementary
access visits by IAEA inspectors.”[2] The United States is the only NWS that has accepted Complementary
Access arrangements.[3] In
addition, it introduced at the 2013 IAEA General Assembly that, “[a]s a
transparency measure, the United States cooperated with the IAEA to allow
international monitoring of the downblending of 50 Metric Tons of [HEU],” and
that it “remain[s] firmly committed to eliminating 34 Metric Tons of
weapons-origin plutonium…under IAEA verification.”[4]
The non-NPT states have concluded
safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66. These non-NPT states have accepted
IAEA inspections of the facilities that they declare as subject to these
agreements. According to the IAEA Annual Report 2012, the facilities placed under
IAEA safeguards or containing safeguarded nuclear material in non-NPT states as
of 31 December 2012 are as follows.
Ø
India:
Six power reactors, two fuel fabrication plants, a reprocessing plant, and a
separate storage facility
Ø
Israel:
A research reactor
Ø
Pakistan:
Three power reactors and two research reactors
Concerning the protocols additional to
non-NPT states’ safeguards agreements (which do not follow the model AP), India
signed it in May 2009 but has not ratified yet. No negotiation has yet begun
for similar protocols with Israel or Pakistan.
The NPDI issued a working paper at the 2013
NPT PrepCom, titled “Wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon
States”, which called for:[5]
Ø Reviewing the operation of the voluntary-offer safeguards agreement and/or
revisiting the voluntary-offer safeguards agreement so that the safeguards will
be applicable to all nuclear material designated by each nuclear-weapon State
as no longer required for military purposes and relevant facilities where it is
located, in a manner neither to exclude such material from the scope of the
safeguards application nor to reverse such material to military uses;
Ø Reviewing the existing scope of the additional protocol to add
measures, if necessary, such as complementary access stipulated in the IAEA
Model Additional Protocol; and
Ø Encourages those nuclear-weapon States
that have not done so, to consider, when identifying certain specified nuclear
material as “excess” for military uses, placing such “excess” under IAEA
verification as soon as practicable, in a manner to make it irreversible
The NAM
countries demanded the NWS to undertake full-scope
safeguards.[6]
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
[1] GC(57)/3, Table A21.
[2] “Statement by the United States of America,” Cluster 2, Second
Session of the Preparatory Committee, 2015 Review Conference of the States
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 26,
2013.
[3] Provisions for complementary access are included in the APs of the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom, but not in the Russian or Chinese APs.
[4] “Statement by the United States of America,” 2013 IAEA General
Conference, September 16, 2013.
[5] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.23, 5 April 2013.
[6] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.18, 21 March 2013.
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