(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
The Hiroshima Report 2012 attempted to
analyze the role and significance of nuclear weapons in the national security
strategies and policies, mainly based on the declaratory policies of the
nuclear-weapon/armed states. In 2013, there have been few significant changes
in their nuclear policies.
A) The current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons
The U.S. Defense Department published the
Nuclear Employment Strategy Report in June 2011, which contains: guidance for
nuclear employment (guiding principles, nuclear employment planning guidance,
reducing the role of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. nuclear hedge); implications
for the U.S. nuclear posture and nuclear stockpile, including nuclear force posture
(U.S. nuclear triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and strategic force
levels), the U.S. nuclear stockpile; and additional implications, such as
resilience and flexibility, nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance
and defense, and increased reliance on conventional or non-nuclear-strike
capabilities or missile defenses.[1]
The Report was based on in-depth analysis as a follow-on to the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review, and directs few new measures or guidance for reducing roles and
significance of U.S. nuclear weapons, except a reduction of the U.S. strategic
nuclear arsenal.
In the Nuclear Employment Strategy Report,
the United States reiterated its intention of continuing “to address the more
familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with Russia and China.” On
Russia, the only peer to the U.S. in nuclear weapons capability, the Report
states that “[a]lthough the need for numerical parity between two countries is
no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War, large disparities in nuclear
capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. Allies and
partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining stable, long-term strategic
relationships, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced.” The
Report also notes that “[t]he United States remains committed to maintaining
strategic stability in U.S.-China relations and supports initiation of a
dialogue on nuclear affairs aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, and
transparent security relationship with China,” while indicating the U.S.
concerns about China’s military modernization and the lack of transparency
surrounding its nuclear program.[2]
Regarding U.S. nuclear targeting, according
the Report, “[t]he new guidance requires the United States to maintain significant
counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries. The new guidance does
not rely on a “counter-value” or ‘minimum deterrence’ strategy.”[3]
Despite the adoption of the Assured Destruction Strategy—based on counter-value
targeting—as a declaratory policy in 1960s, the U.S. actual nuclear employment
policy has continued to be centered on counterforce vis-à-vis opponent’s
nuclear forces, military facilities and so on. The current U.S. nuclear war
plan, known as OPLAN 8010, is also considered to contain counterforce targeting
against, among others, adversaries’ WMD infrastructure, military and national
leadership, and war supporting infrastructure.[4]
On Russia’s nuclear policy, there are few
remarkable changes from the previous year. One potentially interesting news
item reported that Russia plans to gradually expand areas of nuclear submarine
patrols, and to resume them in the southern seas after a hiatus of more than 20
years since the demise of the Soviet Union, according to an unnamed official in
the Russian military General Staff.[5]
The United Kingdom examined “five possible
operating postures for nuclear weapons,” as part of the Trident Alternative
Review in July 2013. These postures include: (1) Continuous deterrence—maintaining
deterrent presence, (2) Focused nuclear deterrence—maintaining a high readiness
posture for a specific period, (3) Sustained nuclear deterrence—a visible
deployment of some deterrent capability, but not at high readiness, (4)
Responsive nuclear deterrence—irregularly deployment in frequency and length in
order not to be predicted by a potential adversary, 5) Preserved nuclear
deterrence—no regularly deployed deterrent platforms but maintaining the
ability.[6]
While stating no recommendation, the report seemed to imply that continuing the
existing deterrence posture is preferable for the U.K. security.
B) Commitment to the “sole purpose,” no first use, and related doctrines
NWS except China have yet to declare a
no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. The United States reiterated in the
Nuclear Employment Strategy that “[t]he fundamental role of U.S. nuclear
weapons remains to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its Allies and
partners,”[7]
but neither adopted a NFU policy nor declared a “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear
weapons as deterring nuclear attack on the United States and its allies.
In 2013, the China’s NFU policy received
attention, due to the fact that it was not mentioned for the first time in the
National Defense White Paper published in April.[8]
The White Paper stated:
If China comes
under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force will act upon the orders of
the [Central Military Commission (CMC)], go into a higher level of readiness,
and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear
weapons against China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear
missile force of the [People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLASAF)] will use
nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack either independently or
together with the nuclear forces of other services.[9]
Yang Yujun, a spokesman of China’s Ministry
of Defense, stated that China has not changed its NFU policy, and explained
that the National Defense White Paper in 2013 “adopted a ‘thematic’ model (zhuanti xing) and focuses specifically
on ‘Diversified Employment of China Armed Forces,’ the title of the new white
paper, and does not address nuclear policy in detail.”[10]
At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, China stated that it “has adhered to the policy of
no-first use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.”[11]
Few significant changes in nuclear policies
were announced by the nuclear-armed states in 2013, either. India maintains a
NFU policy despite reserving an option of nuclear retaliation vis-a-vis a major
biological or chemical attack against it. Pakistan, whose conventional military
power is inferior to India’s, has not declared a NFU policy. Israel, which has
maintained an “opaque nuclear posture,” has not clearly mentioned the role of
nuclear weapons in its security strategy and policies.
North Korea’s actual nuclear strategy or
policies are not clear. Following the adoption of the UN Security Council
Resolution 2094, condemning the North Korean nuclear test in February 2013 and
bolstering non-military sanction measures, North Korea intensified its threats
of military attacks, including use of nuclear weapons, against Japan, South
Korea and the United States. North Korea declared to withdraw from the 60-year
armistice agreement in March, and informed the United States in April that “the
ever-escalating U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and its reckless nuclear
threat will be smashed by the strong will of all the united service personnel
and people and cutting-edge smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear strike
means of the DPRK and that the merciless operation of its revolutionary armed
forces in this regard has been finally examined and ratified.”[12]
C) Negative security assurances
No new development was found regarding negative
security assurances (NSA) in 2013. China is the only NWS that has declared an
unconditional NSA for NNWS and has supported the request of some NNWS, mainly
the NAM countries,[13]
that the NWS provide legally-binding NSAs. The United Kingdom and the United
States have declared not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS
that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their non-proliferation
obligations. France and Russia maintain their respective unilateral NSAs made
in 1995, pledging that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against the NNWS parties to the NPT unless they or their allies are invaded or
attacked by a NNWS in cooperation with a NWS.
D) Signing and ratifying the protocols of the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones
The protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free
zones (NWFZ) treaties include the provision of legally-binding NSAs. At the
time of writing, only the Protocol of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) has been
ratified by all NWS, as shown in the Table 1-3 below. In 2013, no NWS ratified
protocols additionally.
(Table 1-3)
At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, France stated that
the NWS were “ready to sign”[14] the Protocol to the Southeast Asian NWFZ Treaty, and Russia
mentioned that it “has
completed all internal procedures necessary to accede to” it.[15]
Regarding the Protocol to the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty, France announced that
NWS and Central Asian countries had resumed dialogues,[16] and
Russia told that it was “ready to work both with [other NWS] and with the countries
of the region to finalize its legal status. This can and must be done before the
end of this year.”[17]
However, no actual progress was made with either of the protocols during 2013.
Some NWS
stated reservations or added interpretations to protocols of the NWFZ treaties
when signing or ratifying them. At the 2013 NPR PrepCom, the NPDI “call[ed] upon
all nuclear-weapon States to withdraw any reservations or interpretative
declarations made to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their protocols
contrary to the object and purpose of such treaties”[18].
E) Relying on extended nuclear deterrence
In 2013, the United States and its allies,
including NATO countries, Australia, Japan and South Korea, maintained their
respective policies on extended nuclear deterrence. Currently, the United
States deploys from 150 to 200 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs in five NATO
countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey), and thus maintains
nuclear sharing arrangements with them. While no U.S. nuclear force is deployed
outside of its territory except the European NATO countries mentioned above,
the United States (and perhaps its allies) recognized the importance of showing
a U.S. presence when needed. Facing North Korea’s provocations vis-à-vis Japan,
South Korean and the United States, after the North’s nuclear test in February
2013, the United States sent B-2 strategic bombers from Guam to South Korea to
participate in annual military exercises there, aiming to show its will to
defend South Korea, and to ensure the credibility of extended deterrence.
(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)
[1] U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy
of the United States: Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C.,” June 19, 2013.
[2] Ibid., p.
3.
[3] Ibid., p.
4.
[4] Hans M. Kristensen, “Obama and the Nuclear War Plan,” Federation of the American Scientists Issue
Brief, February 2010, p. 6.
[5] “Russia to Send Nuclear Submarines to Southern Seas,” Reuters, June 1, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/01/us-russia-submarines-patrol-idUSBRE95007V20130601.
[6] Trident Alternative Review,
pp. 22-23.
[7] US Department of Defense, “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of
the United States: Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C.,” June 19, 2013, p. 4.
[8] See, for example, James M. Acton, “Is China Changing Its Position
on Nuclear Weapons?” New York Times, April
18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/opinion/is-china-changing-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons.html?_r=0;
James M. Acton, “Debating China's No-First-Use Commitment: James Acton Responds,”
Proliferation Analysis, April 22,
2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/22/debating-china-s-no-first-use-commitment-james-acton-responds/g0lx.
[9] The People's Republic of China, “The Diversified Employment of
China's Armed Forces,” April 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm.
[10] Hui Zhang, “China’s Nuclear Policy: Changing or Not?” Power and Policy, May 31, 2013, http://www.powerandpolicy.com/2013/05/31/chinas-nuclear-policy-changing-or-not/.
[11] “Statement by China,” Cluster 1, Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Geneva, April 25, 2013.
[12] “U.S. Should Ponder Over Grave Situation: Spokesman,” KCNA, April 4, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201304/news04/20130404-03ee.html.
[13] The NAM countries called for effective, universal, unconditional,
non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons again in the 2013 NPT PrepCom. NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15,
21 March 2013.
[14] “Statement by France,” at the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Cluster I, Geneva, April 24,
2013.
[15] “Statement by
Mikhail Ulyanov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation Director of
the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for
the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Geneva, 22 April 2013.
[16] “Statement by France,” at the Second Session of the Preparatory
Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Cluster I, Geneva, April 24,
2013.
[17] “Statement by
Mikhail Ulyanov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation Director of
the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for
the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Geneva, 22 April 2013.
[18] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.24, 11 April 2013.
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