Introduction

The Hiroshima Report 2014 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)
--Exective Summary (in Japanese and English)
The Hiroshima Report 2012 (PDF) can be downloaded from the following links:
--Report and Evaluations (in Japanese and English)
--Evaluation Sheet (in Japanese and English)

January 9, 2014

[DRAFT: Hiroshima Report 2013] 1-(4) Diminishing the Role and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in the National Security Strategies and Policies

(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)

The Hiroshima Report 2012 attempted to analyze the role and significance of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies and policies, mainly based on the declaratory policies of the nuclear-weapon/armed states. In 2013, there have been few significant changes in their nuclear policies.


A) The current status of the roles and significance of nuclear weapons

The U.S. Defense Department published the Nuclear Employment Strategy Report in June 2011, which contains: guidance for nuclear employment (guiding principles, nuclear employment planning guidance, reducing the role of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. nuclear hedge); implications for the U.S. nuclear posture and nuclear stockpile, including nuclear force posture (U.S. nuclear triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and strategic force levels), the U.S. nuclear stockpile; and additional implications, such as resilience and flexibility, nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance and defense, and increased reliance on conventional or non-nuclear-strike capabilities or missile defenses.[1] The Report was based on in-depth analysis as a follow-on to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and directs few new measures or guidance for reducing roles and significance of U.S. nuclear weapons, except a reduction of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal.

In the Nuclear Employment Strategy Report, the United States reiterated its intention of continuing “to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with Russia and China.” On Russia, the only peer to the U.S. in nuclear weapons capability, the Report states that “[a]lthough the need for numerical parity between two countries is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold War, large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. Allies and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining stable, long-term strategic relationships, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced.” The Report also notes that “[t]he United States remains committed to maintaining strategic stability in U.S.-China relations and supports initiation of a dialogue on nuclear affairs aimed at fostering a more stable, resilient, and transparent security relationship with China,” while indicating the U.S. concerns about China’s military modernization and the lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear program.[2]

Regarding U.S. nuclear targeting, according the Report, “[t]he new guidance requires the United States to maintain significant counterforce capabilities against potential adversaries. The new guidance does not rely on a “counter-value” or ‘minimum deterrence’ strategy.”[3] Despite the adoption of the Assured Destruction Strategy—based on counter-value targeting—as a declaratory policy in 1960s, the U.S. actual nuclear employment policy has continued to be centered on counterforce vis-à-vis opponent’s nuclear forces, military facilities and so on. The current U.S. nuclear war plan, known as OPLAN 8010, is also considered to contain counterforce targeting against, among others, adversaries’ WMD infrastructure, military and national leadership, and war supporting infrastructure.[4]

On Russia’s nuclear policy, there are few remarkable changes from the previous year. One potentially interesting news item reported that Russia plans to gradually expand areas of nuclear submarine patrols, and to resume them in the southern seas after a hiatus of more than 20 years since the demise of the Soviet Union, according to an unnamed official in the Russian military General Staff.[5]

The United Kingdom examined “five possible operating postures for nuclear weapons,” as part of the Trident Alternative Review in July 2013. These postures include: (1) Continuous deterrence—maintaining deterrent presence, (2) Focused nuclear deterrence—maintaining a high readiness posture for a specific period, (3) Sustained nuclear deterrence—a visible deployment of some deterrent capability, but not at high readiness, (4) Responsive nuclear deterrence—irregularly deployment in frequency and length in order not to be predicted by a potential adversary, 5) Preserved nuclear deterrence—no regularly deployed deterrent platforms but maintaining the ability.[6] While stating no recommendation, the report seemed to imply that continuing the existing deterrence posture is preferable for the U.K. security.

B) Commitment to the “sole purpose,” no first use, and related doctrines

NWS except China have yet to declare a no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. The United States reiterated in the Nuclear Employment Strategy that “[t]he fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons remains to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its Allies and partners,”[7] but neither adopted a NFU policy nor declared a “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons as deterring nuclear attack on the United States and its allies.

In 2013, the China’s NFU policy received attention, due to the fact that it was not mentioned for the first time in the National Defense White Paper published in April.[8] The White Paper stated:
If China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force will act upon the orders of the [Central Military Commission (CMC)], go into a higher level of readiness, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the [People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLASAF)] will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack either independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services.[9]
Yang Yujun, a spokesman of China’s Ministry of Defense, stated that China has not changed its NFU policy, and explained that the National Defense White Paper in 2013 “adopted a ‘thematic’ model (zhuanti xing) and focuses specifically on ‘Diversified Employment of China Armed Forces,’ the title of the new white paper, and does not address nuclear policy in detail.”[10] At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, China stated that it “has adhered to the policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances.”[11]

Few significant changes in nuclear policies were announced by the nuclear-armed states in 2013, either. India maintains a NFU policy despite reserving an option of nuclear retaliation vis-a-vis a major biological or chemical attack against it. Pakistan, whose conventional military power is inferior to India’s, has not declared a NFU policy. Israel, which has maintained an “opaque nuclear posture,” has not clearly mentioned the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy and policies.

North Korea’s actual nuclear strategy or policies are not clear. Following the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2094, condemning the North Korean nuclear test in February 2013 and bolstering non-military sanction measures, North Korea intensified its threats of military attacks, including use of nuclear weapons, against Japan, South Korea and the United States. North Korea declared to withdraw from the 60-year armistice agreement in March, and informed the United States in April that “the ever-escalating U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK and its reckless nuclear threat will be smashed by the strong will of all the united service personnel and people and cutting-edge smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear strike means of the DPRK and that the merciless operation of its revolutionary armed forces in this regard has been finally examined and ratified.”[12]

C) Negative security assurances

No new development was found regarding negative security assurances (NSA) in 2013. China is the only NWS that has declared an unconditional NSA for NNWS and has supported the request of some NNWS, mainly the NAM countries,[13] that the NWS provide legally-binding NSAs. The United Kingdom and the United States have declared not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations. France and Russia maintain their respective unilateral NSAs made in 1995, pledging that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the NNWS parties to the NPT unless they or their allies are invaded or attacked by a NNWS in cooperation with a NWS.

D) Signing and ratifying the protocols of the treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones

The protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) treaties include the provision of legally-binding NSAs. At the time of writing, only the Protocol of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) has been ratified by all NWS, as shown in the Table 1-3 below. In 2013, no NWS ratified protocols additionally.

(Table 1-3)

At the 2013 NPT PrepCom, France stated that the NWS were “ready to sign”[14] the Protocol to the Southeast Asian NWFZ Treaty, and Russia mentioned that it “has completed all internal procedures necessary to accede to” it.[15] Regarding the Protocol to the Central Asian NWFZ Treaty, France announced that NWS and Central Asian countries had resumed dialogues,[16] and Russia told that it was “ready to work both with [other NWS] and with the countries of the region to finalize its legal status. This can and must be done before the end of this year.”[17] However, no actual progress was made with either of the protocols during 2013.

Some NWS stated reservations or added interpretations to protocols of the NWFZ treaties when signing or ratifying them. At the 2013 NPR PrepCom, the NPDI “call[ed] upon all nuclear-weapon States to withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations made to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their protocols contrary to the object and purpose of such treaties”[18].

E) Relying on extended nuclear deterrence

In 2013, the United States and its allies, including NATO countries, Australia, Japan and South Korea, maintained their respective policies on extended nuclear deterrence. Currently, the United States deploys from 150 to 200 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs in five NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey), and thus maintains nuclear sharing arrangements with them. While no U.S. nuclear force is deployed outside of its territory except the European NATO countries mentioned above, the United States (and perhaps its allies) recognized the importance of showing a U.S. presence when needed. Facing North Korea’s provocations vis-à-vis Japan, South Korean and the United States, after the North’s nuclear test in February 2013, the United States sent B-2 strategic bombers from Guam to South Korea to participate in annual military exercises there, aiming to show its will to defend South Korea, and to ensure the credibility of extended deterrence.

(Drafted by Hirofumi Tosaki, CPDNP)


[1] U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States: Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C.,” June 19, 2013.
[2] Ibid., p. 3.
[3] Ibid., p. 4.
[4] Hans M. Kristensen, “Obama and the Nuclear War Plan,” Federation of the American Scientists Issue Brief, February 2010, p. 6.
[5] “Russia to Send Nuclear Submarines to Southern Seas,” Reuters, June 1, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/01/us-russia-submarines-patrol-idUSBRE95007V20130601.
[6] Trident Alternative Review, pp. 22-23.
[7] US Department of Defense, “Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States: Specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C.,” June 19, 2013, p. 4.
[8] See, for example, James M. Acton, “Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons?” New York Times, April 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/opinion/is-china-changing-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons.html?_r=0; James M. Acton, “Debating China's No-First-Use Commitment: James Acton Responds,” Proliferation Analysis, April 22, 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/22/debating-china-s-no-first-use-commitment-james-acton-responds/g0lx.
[9] The People's Republic of China, “The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces,” April 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-04/16/c_132312681.htm.
[10] Hui Zhang, “China’s Nuclear Policy: Changing or Not?” Power and Policy, May 31, 2013, http://www.powerandpolicy.com/2013/05/31/chinas-nuclear-policy-changing-or-not/.
[11] “Statement by China,” Cluster 1, Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Geneva, April 25, 2013.
[12] “U.S. Should Ponder Over Grave Situation: Spokesman,” KCNA, April 4, 2013, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201304/news04/20130404-03ee.html.
[13] The NAM countries called for effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons again in the 2013 NPT PrepCom. NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.15, 21 March 2013.
[14] “Statement by France,” at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Cluster I, Geneva, April 24, 2013.
[15] “Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Geneva, 22 April 2013.
[16] “Statement by France,” at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Cluster I, Geneva, April 24, 2013.
[17] “Statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Geneva, 22 April 2013.
[18] NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.24, 11 April 2013.

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