(Following is a draft version, which is subject to be updated or revised. Your comments and feedbacks are welcome!)
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A) Minimization of HEU in Civilian Use
HEU has been utilized for civilian purposes through the use of research reactors and isotope production reactors. However, since HEU is suitable for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, if it is removed from a regulatory control without authorization, such as by theft, it becomes possible that non-state actors as well as states can produce nuclear explosive devices. Against this concern, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was commenced in 2004 by the
for the purposes of returning Russian- or U.S.-origin HEU located in civilian
sites in the world to its respective origins and converting research reactors
to use low enriched uranium (LEU). The Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and
2012 upheld this effort as one of the most important actions to be taken. U.S.
According to the report of the Global Security Partnership, 82 research reactors had been converted to LEU use, and 235kg of HEU from Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Poland had been returned to Russia, while 12kg of HEU from Mexico had been returned to the U.S. during the period October 2012 to September 2013.
At the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and other occasions, the following progresses and commitments on the minimization of HEU were expressed:
Ø China: Based on the agreement with the U.S. in 2010, it is conducting the conversion of research reactors to use LEU.
Ø France: It is working closely with other countries for the technology development for the conversion to use LEU.
Ø Russia: It has converted 1,320kg of unirradiated HEU to LEU since 2010. It is planning to accept HEU from Uzbekistan and Ukraine. In addition, in cooperation with the U.S. it is conducting the technology development and feasibility study for LEU conversion of six research reactors at Kurchatov Atomic Energy Research Institute.
Ø United States: It has converted 10.5tons of U.S. HEU and 2tons of Russian HEU to be LEU and has been supporting the return of 400kg of HEU from 10 countries to their respective origins.
Ø Israel: It has returned HEU to the U.S.
Ø Austria: It has returned HEU.
Ø Australia: It has shut down the research reactors that used HEU and returned all spent fuel to its origin. It has developed technology of radiopharmaceutical production using LEU. It returned exessive HEU to the U.S. in 2013.
Ø Belgium: As a leading producer of radioactive isotope in the world, it is cooperating with the U.S., France, and the Netherlands in minimizing the use of HEU. It has exchanged diplomatic notes with the U.S. about the conversion of the BR2 research reactor and the processing facility of the National Institute for Radioelements (I.R.E.) and is making preparation efforts to return its HEU to the U.S. in 2014.
Ø Canada: It returned HEU to the U.S. in 2012 as a subsequent effort made in 2010. It is planning to finish the return of all HEU by 2018. It has financially contributed $8,000,000 to the conversion activities to use LEU in Mexico and Vietnam.
Ø Kazakhstan: It has returned HEU of the WR-K research reactor to Russia and is currently working on its conversion to LEU use. The conversion is expected to be completed in 2014.
Ø ROK: It is conducting technology development for the conversion to use LEU and is cooperating with other countries for the application of this technology.
Ø Mexico: It completed the conversion to use LEU and returned the all HEU in 2012.
Ø Netherland: It has completed the conversion of its research reactors to use LEU.
Ø South Africa: It has completed the conversion to use LEU of major supply facilities of molybdenum-99 and returned HEU to the U.S.
Ø Sweden: It converted the all research reactors to use LEU in the 1990s. It is currently contributing to the international effort of the minimization of HEU use.
B) Prevention of Illicit Trafficking
Countries with nuclear material need to effectively implement measures ranging from strict controls at both state and facility levels—including nuclear material accounting and control—in order to detect and prevent illicit transfers of nuclear material to other states or non-state actors. The Communiqué of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit lists those measures, including the advancement of technical capabilities in the fields of national inspection and detection of nuclear and other radioactive material at the borders, further utilization of legal, intelligence and financial tools to effectively prosecute offenses, participation in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) program, provision of necessary information relating to nuclear and other radioactive material outside of regulatory control, and sharing of information on individuals involved in trafficking offenses with INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization.
Established in 1995, the IAEA ITDB is the database on incidents related to unauthorized possession, illicit trafficking, illegal dispersal of radioactive material, and discovery of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. By providing and sharing information of relevant incidents, participating countries are expected to serve as international surveillance against illicit trafficking and strengthen their efforts for its prevention, and for nuclear security performance as a whole. As of December 2012, 120 countries have joined the ITDB; all the surveyed countries except for Syria, Egypt, and North Korea participate in it.
A total of 2,331 incidents have been reported from 1995 until the end of 2012. In 2012 alone, a total of 160 incidents were reported. The breakdown of incidents in 2012 is as follows.
Ø 17 incidents of “illegal possession of and attempts to sell nuclear material or radioactive sources”,
Ø 24 incidents of “thefts or losses of radioactive sources”, and
Ø 119 incidents of “discoveries of uncontrolled material, unauthorized movement or storage of nuclear material, radioactive sources and/or radioactive contaminated material.”
The detail of information on incidents and illicit trafficking is not published so as not to discourage participating countries to report related incident(s). Therefore, as it is not possible to assess the involvement of the surveyed countries, this report considers only their respective participation status as an index.
Other preventive measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material include the development of legal instruments for export control and detection capability, such as the installation of sensing devices for radiological material at national borders. The following describes some of efforts taken as preventive measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material:
Ø India: It updated its list of dual-use items in 2013 in accordance with the Guideline II of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Ø Israel: It has established a legal instrument for illegal transfer prevention. Under the U.S.-led Megaports Initiative, it shares its experience in countering illicit trafficking with others.
Ø Pakistan: It has revised its controlled list to strengthen its export control. It is working to install Special Nuclear Material Portals at major entrance and exit points, as measures for deterrence, detection, and prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radiological material.
Ø Brazil: It has amended its legal instrument against illicit trafficking. It is providing training for border guards of the Mercosur states on prevention, detection and response of illicit transfer of nuclear and other radiological material and sharing relevant information and best practices with them.
Ø Mexico: It conducts capacity building programs to develop the laws and regulations of export control of dual-use items and enhance export control capability. It has improved the capabilities for detection of nuclear and other radiological material at five ports under the U.S.-led Megaports Initiative.
Ø Sweden: It organized the Second INTERPOL Radiological and Nuclear Trafficking and Terrorism Analysis Conference in 2012.
Ø UAE: It has established legal instruments, including the control list for export control. It has developed enhanced control capabilities at ports, including the installation of detection equipment as well as the provision of personnel training through bilateral assistance programs, including the Megaports initiative.
Table 3-6 shows the implementation status of the minimization of HEU for peaceful purposes and measures for the prevention of illegal transfer of nuclear material and other radiological material based on official statements made at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit or other opportunities.
(Table: The implementation status of the minimization of HEU for peaceful purposes and measures for the prevention of illegal transfer)
C) Acceptance of International Nuclear Security Review Missions
In order to support the development of the nuclear security system and capabilities, the IAEA provides advisory services such as the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) and the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) to its member states. Upon the request of a member state, the INSServ provides recommendations to improve a broad spectrum of nuclear security activities of the state by reviewing its nuclear security system and requirements. Also upon the request of a member state, the IPPAS provides recommendations to improve the physical protection system of nuclear material, associated facilities, and transport systems of the state. As IPPAS reviews a state’s nuclear security system in detail with a particular focus on the state’s physical protection system, it is regarded as an in-depth review service compared to INSServ. In IPPAS missions, an IPPAS team consisting of physical protection experts organized by the IAEA visits government organizations and nuclear facilities in a state, reviews the physical protection system of the facility in detail, and conducts hearing investigations, in order to assess whether or not the reviewed physical protection system is in line with the recommendations of the IAEA INFCIRC/225 and to provide advice where necessary for its improvement.
Because the IPPAS is a service to review the details of the physical protection system that include sensitive information of a requesting state, it is expected to greatly contribute to the enhancement of the physical protection system of the state in particular and its nuclear security performance in general. Therefore, the acceptance of the IPPAS indicates that the state is seriously working to strengthen its nuclear security system.
Since the IPPAS was initiated in 1996, 56 IPPAS missions have been conducted in 37 states (see Table 3-8). In 2013, Romania received the follow-up mission of the IPPAS, and Australia, Hungary, and the U.S. received the IPPAS.
D) Technology Development ―Nuclear Forensics
Nuclear forensics is the technological method for the investigation of nuclear and other radiological material that has been removed without authorization from regulatory control and seized by a law enforcement authority. The role of nuclear forensics is to investigate the original location, history, and transport path of the seized material, and the intent of its removal, by analyzing its composition and physical and chemical form. It is considered as one of the key technologies to complement nuclear security efforts. Nuclear forensics activities include the categorization and characterization of a seized material and the interpretation of their results that includes the comparison of the results with a database and numerical simulation.
(Table: Nuclear forensics capabilities that were reported at the ITWG-17)
In the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, international cooperation to build a nuclear forensics capability of each country was recommended. Subsequently, in the communique of the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, the importance of international cooperation in developing nuclear forensics capacity was reaffirmed. As such an international cooperation initiative, the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (ITWG) was established in 1996 for the purpose of addressing the issue of illegal transfers following the end of the Cold War. The ITWG serves as the platform to support the technological development and sharing of nuclear forensic methods.
According to the reports made at the ITWG-17 (Table 3-7: Nuclear forensics capabilities of surveyed countries reported at the ITWG-17), France, the U.K., the U.S., Australia, Canada, Japan, ROK, Sweden, and Switzerland are currently working for the development of nuclear forensics capability. Other than these countries, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC), as EU’s effort, is conducting the characterization and interpretation of nuclear and other radioactive material seized in EU countries. Its Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), located in Germany, is a main laboratory for its nuclear forensics activities. The Netherlands is carrying out a program to promote the international cooperation on technology development of nuclear forensics. In this regard, it has established a website to share the information of each country’s nuclear forensics activities, aiming to harmonize their activities, and share best practice and a glossary of nuclear forensics. The country also organized an international table-top exercise of nuclear forensics in 2012.
E) Capacity Building and Support Activities
In response to increased awareness about the importance of nuclear security capacity building and international cooperation in this area, many participating countries at the Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits reported their intentions to establish or support the establishment of Centers of Excellence (COE) for nuclear security training. These states include
South Korea ,
South Africa ,
Pakistan , the Switzerland , and the U.K. As a
regional effort, U.S.
expressed to have actively supported the development of
the EU Centre of Excellence on CBRN (chemical, biological, radioactive
materials, nuclear) risk mitigation. Sweden
Of particular note, Kazakhstan established the Kazakhstan Regional Training Centre to foster nuclear security culture, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). It is currently providing training on nuclear material accounting and control, the physical protection of nuclear material, and countermeasures against trafficking. France is offering nuclear security training through its Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Security (IRSN) and cooperating with India’s Global Center for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) in the area of nuclear security and research development. In cooperation with the U.S. DOE, China is currently establishing State Nuclear Security Technology Center (SNSTC). It is scheduled to start its capacity building activities for domestic participants and Asian countries from 2015. ROK is also in the process of establishing the International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academy (INSA) with the support of the U.S. DOE. It is expected to be completed in February 2014. After its completion, it will provide training on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security matters, both nationally and internationally. Japan, in cooperation with the U.S. DOE, established the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security (ISCN) at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), and is currently providing training and support activities in the areas of nuclear security and safeguards.
In spite of these remarkable developments, some have pointed out the risk of overlap and redundancies in the activities of these centers if, with similar objectives and targets, they carry out their training activities in the same region without prior coordination. To reduce such duplication and to facilitate exchange of experts, information as well as training material, the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers (NSTC・NSSC) was established in 2012 under the leadership of the IAEA. Through its annual meeting and the meetings of three working groups (WG1: Harmonization and cooperation, WG2: Best practice, WG3: Information management/other emerging issues), the NSTC・NSSC is expected to serve as the platform on which participating countries can improve the ability and effectiveness of their capacity building activities.
One of the purposes of this NSTC・NSSC initiative is to standardize the quality of nuclear security training. To this end, the IAEA is cooperating with its member States for the development of training curriculum for nuclear security. As a part of this effort, Brazil, in cooperation with the IAEA, is establishing the Nuclear Security Support Center. In the same way, Pakistan established its Nuclear Security Training Center and is currently providing nuclear security training, mainly to the staff of Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority. In addition, the Netherlands, in cooperation with the IAEA, has since 2012 been providing a masters program in nuclear security for IAEA member states at the Reactor Institute Delft of Delft University of Technology.
Enhancing the effectiveness of nuclear security training by harmonizing the activities of COEs is also one of the purposes of the NSTC・NSSC initiative. In this regard, there is some concern that the content and targeted participants of the nuclear security training courses of Japan (ISCN), ROK (INSA), and China (SNSTC) will overlap or be duplicated, and thus, possibly undermining the overall effectiveness of nuclear security training. Against this concern, an effort to achieve the harmonization of these three COEs began in 2012 under the initiative of the IAEA. Because ROK’s INSA and China’s SNSTC have not yet been established, this effort has thus far been limited to information sharing about their respective activities and plans to date. But, differentiating the training contents of each COE by characterizing them, and harmonizing their training schedules to avoid overlaps, are currently being considered as possibilities for the future.
F) IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and Nuclear Security Fund
In March 2002 the IAEA Board of Governors approved the first three-year Nuclear Security Plan as a program to combat the risk of nuclear terrorism. The third Nuclear Security Plan covering the period 2010-2013 was approved in August 2009 and has been implemented. Moreover, the IAEA established the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), a voluntary funding mechanism to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism, and has called for member states’ contributions.
According to the IAEA Annual Report 2012, 19 States (including China, France, Russia, the U.S., the U.K., India, Canada, Germany, ROK, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden) and the EU made extra budgetary funding. The total revenue of the NSF amounted to some €25 million in 2012. Table 3-8 shows only the countries that made funding contributions in 2012.
G) Participation in International Efforts
The establishment of “Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction” (G8GP) was agreed in the G8 Kananaskis Summit in 2002. In addition to the G8 member states (including France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., the U.S. and Russia), donor participants (Australia, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, etc.) have participated in the G8GP and carried out various projects, in particular denuclearization cooperation in Russia. The membership of the G8GP had expanded to 27 states at the end of 2013.
The G8 Summit in St. Petersburg in July 2006 agreed to establish the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), proposed by Russia and the U.S. Participating states are to make efforts to fulfill the eight principles, including the improvement of physical protection measures for nuclear and other radiological material, the enhancement of security of civilian nuclear facilities and of detection capability of illegal transfers, and the prevention of financial assistance to terrorists upon the adoption of “the Statement of Principles”. Since the first meeting of the GICNT in Morocco in October 2006, its membership has expanded to be 85 states (including Australia, China, France, Russia, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, ROK, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.) and 4 international organizations as official observers.
On the one hand, the aforementioned initiatives of the acceptance of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) by the IAEA, the effort for nuclear forensics, and the commitment to nuclear security capacity-building and support, are considered to contribute to the improvement of nuclear security performances of surveyed countries, and thus, demonstrate their respective nuclear security system. On the other hand, the contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund and the participation in the G8 Global Partnership (G8GP) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) indicate the commitment to nuclear security by each country and can be used for an overall evaluation of each country’s nuclear security system.
(Table 3-8 below shows the participation status in and effort for these nuclear security initiatives.)
(Drafted by Kazuko Hamada, Japan Atomic Energy Agency)
 Emily Mella, “Reported Accomplishments of Selected Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs by Agency for Fiscal Year 2012,” Global Security Partnership, August 2013.
 NTI, “Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action: Second Edition,” January 2014, p.40.
 Although the total number of the incidents in 2012 is written as 147 in the IAEA Annual Report 2012, it should be 160 as the total of the three breakdowns and thus, “160” is used in this report.
 IAEA Annual Report 2012, p. 69.
 This is the customs union of South American countries.
 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary “Work Plan of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit,” April 13, 2010.
 “Seoul Communiqué”, 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.
 South Korea’s INSA is planned to be established in February 2014. China’s SNSTC is scheduled to be completed in 2015.
 The Nuclear Security Plan for 2014-2017 was approved in September 2013.
 GOV/2009/54-GC(53)/18, 17 August 2009.
 The IAEA has an unstable budget situation. Despite its growing role in nuclear security, the Agency is obliged to depend on extra-budgetary contributions, which are not necessarily granted from one year to another.
 “IAEA Annual Report 2012,” p. 71.
 The followings are partner states (surveyed states are underlined). Core partners: The U.S., Canada, Germany, France, Italy, The U.K., Japan, Russia, The EU. Other partner states: Australia, Belgium, The Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, ROK, Mexico, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine. Partner states that are considering participation in it: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, UAE, Jordan.
 See the U.S. Department of State homepage, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c37083.htm. As for the GICNT’s key multilateral meeting, workshops and exercises, see also the U.S. Department of State homepage, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/172982.pdf.